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Growing Alignment among U.S. Adversaries

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Drafted by Maureen Page, this paper reflects the collective thinking of the Belfer Center seminar series on adversarial alignment. David Sanger, Sydney Tucker, Charles Landow, Steve Wilbur, and Ali Wyne all made significant contributions. 

Xi Jinping, Kim Jong Un, and Vladimir Putin walk side by side in Beijing
In this photo provided by the North Korean government, Russian President Vladimir Putin, from left, Chinese President Xi Jinping and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un walk to attend a military parade marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II at the Tiananmen Square in Beijing Wednesday, Sept. 3, 2025. Independent journalists were not given access to cover the event depicted in this image distributed by the North Korean government. The content of this image is as provided and cannot be independently verified. (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP)

Iran’s conflict with the United States and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine have accelerated cooperation among the United States’ primary adversaries – China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran – all of whom share the strategic priority of countering the West. Russia and China have dialed up political and military support to Iran while munitions, troops, and components from North Korea, Iran, and China have been crucial to Russia’s war effort in Ukraine.  

Yet it is worth interrogating whether this deepening cooperation – called adversarial alignment – marks enduring partnerships that rival the West’s network of alliances or is more posturing than substantive cooperation. Similarly, it is crucial to consider how the current climate in which U.S. Allies and partners are seeking to de-risk from dependency on Washington impacts Western efforts to counter adversarial alignment.  

Since early 2026, the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs has led in-depth discussions with experts on the evolution of the ties among China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. This effort has produced the following key takeaways based on conditions at the time and with the acknowledgement that multiple pathways for these relationships are possible. 

  • Adversary cooperation that is most potent – through the lens of being most threatening to U.S. and Western interests – is transpiring within a web of bilateral relationships while tri- or quadrilateral cooperation remains mostly window dressing. In pursuing this “strategic transactionalism,” the four countries have bartered flexible forms of bilateral cooperation – such as North Korean ground troops deployed to Russia – that have provided just-in-time gap filling, often in exchange for strategic guarantees or cooperative agreements intended to provide long term benefit. As opposed to a like-for-like model, these are pairings of asymmetric but complementary capabilities such as Russia’s battlefield experience using artificial intelligence coupled with China’s enormous industrial capacity to produce military kit.   

 

  • The risk to the United States of simultaneity – concurrent military action by more than one of these adversaries – is significant and does not require adversaries to develop vastly more integration among their militaries. Plausible near-term scenarios include a renewed Iran flare-up coinciding with a North Korean provocation on the Korean peninsula, or Russian escalation in Europe paired with Chinese coercion short of war in the South China Sea. A relevant historical example is the degree to which the Axis Powers at the start of World War II stretched U.S. and Allied capabilities by operating in different geographic theaters, even without demonstrating the sophistication of integrated military operations. The degree of integration and shared threat perceptions among China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran already exceeds what the Axis Powers demonstrated at the start of World War II.  

 

  • The longstanding and accelerating China-Russia partnership is the strategically significant engine behind adversarial alignment. Presidents Xi and Putin share an affinity for each other and have driven a “no-limits” partnership between Beijing and Moscow, forged on the common goal of curtailing U.S. influence. The two leaders have met dozens of times, probably more than any other pair of sitting world leaders. To be clear, Russia and China have differences – such as rival geostrategic interests in the Arctic and Central Asia – but they have developed means to manage or compartmentalize these differences. China has sought to calibrate and hide its public support to Russia – such as by not selling full weapons systems to Russia for Ukraine – to avoid further antagonizing the West. This hedging pattern is consistent across each of Beijing’s relationships with the four countries: China condemns U.S. strikes against Iran while expanding economic ties in the Gulf; touts the partnership with Russia while positioning to participate in postwar Ukrainian reconstruction; and maintains its treaty alliance with North Korea while seeking to stabilize relations with South Korea following President Lee Jae-myung’s call for a “new chapter.”  

 

  • Beijing is a far more powerful actor than the other states and one more sensitive to international scrutiny. As such, China sets the speed limit on cooperation with the other three countries.  Unlike Moscow, Tehran, and Pyongyang, Beijing does not act like a global spoiler and is instead highly integrated into the international system. Moreover, China has a historic preference for flexible alignments over binding alliances, much in line with the “strategic transactionalism” among the four countries. Beijing seeks both to retain a perception of neutrality and maximize commercial opportunities – such as by having sold drone components to both Russia and Ukraine. It holds back on more fulsome military support to Russia’s war against Ukraine to manage blowback from the West. 

 

  • Russia’s strategic priority of a victory in the Ukraine war has driven Moscow’s embrace of the other three, and Moscow has gained crucial support for its war effort, including Iranian drones, Chinese components, and North Korean munitions and ground troops. A long-term cost of this war support has been the acceleration of Russia’s economic dependence on China. While Russia provides China insight into the current combat operations and performance of U.S. and Western weapons systems, Beijing is clearly gaining the upper hand in the relationship, owing to its economic and geopolitical advantages over Moscow.  

 

  • North Korea is an opportunistic actor and has used the Ukraine war to diversify its support beyond China to Russia. Pyongyang has gained humanitarian, economic, and military cooperation from Russia in exchange for its provision of munitions and ground troops for the Ukraine war. Equally noteworthy is that North Korea has deepened its partnership with Russia without prompting visible backlash or concern from Beijing.   

 

  • Iran has experienced a significant reversal of fortunes since the February start of its war with the United States, moving from the least influential among the four countries to the recipient of expanded Russian and Chinese support against the United States. Iran’s ability to close the Strait of Hormuz has reinforced its importance to the world economy, and specifically to China, a major consumer of the region’s oil.  

 

  • In attempting to counter adversarial alignment, the United States and its Allies face the dilemma that the more public effort they expend to divide China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, the more incentive they give the four countries to unite. As such, the most effective means for the United States and Allies to forestall adversarial alignment is by throwing sand in the gears: using a coherent multinational toolkit of subtle and cost-imposing measures to create friction in this cooperation. Such measures include coordinated and agile sanctions that keep pace with adversarial circumvention, export controls on dual-use technologies, strengthening of Western alliances, and engagement with countries such as Brazil, India, and other Middle Powers to prevent the spread of this alignment.  

 

Three drivers are likely to shape the next phase of adversarial alignment:  

 

  • In the near term, a prolonged or even on-again-off-again conflict between the Unites States and Iran will fuel increasing levels of assistance from Beijing and Moscow to Tehran and continue to widen the aperture for adversary cooperation. Throughout the conflict, Iran has demonstrated its impact on global energy markets and its importance to Beijing and Moscow, which has forced both capitals to prioritize ties with Tehran. 

 

  • The shifting power dynamic between China and Russia, and the question of whether Beijing wields this to make Russia a client state, could reshape adversary cooperation. At present, China is the more powerful international actor, but Russia’s willingness to take action and incur risk in domains relevant to China has afforded it outsized and disproportionate influence over the direction and impact of adversarial alignment. However, this will only hold true over the next five years if China sticks to its current approach of treating Russia as a peer amid the obvious and growing Chinese economic capture of Russia. Additionally, since Xi is 73 years old and Putin is 74 years old, a longer-term question looms as to whether future leaders will maintain the “no-limits” partnership.  
     
  • Also, over the long term, China’s development of advanced technologies and its global dominance over the critical inputs to manufacturing such technology will drive expanded Russian, North Korean, and Iranian reliance on Beijing. The three countries will depend on the Chinese technology stack, and Beijing could plausibly leverage this dependence to pressure the other three countries to fuel China’s great power competition with the United States in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and biotechnology. Whether this turns into a relatively collaborative effort under Chinese leadership – such as a combined testbed for development and deployment of advanced technology – or the subservience of Moscow, Pyongyang, and Tehran to Beijing remains to be determined. 
Recommended citation

Page, Maureen. “Growing Alignment among U.S. Adversaries.” November 18, 2026