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Simon Saradzhyan
Comparing the U.S. intelligence community’s newly-released Annual Threat Assessment-2026 with the previous edition of this document reveals a change in how this community approaches analyzing Russia and other countries that negatively impact U.S. national security. While the 2025 assessment had separate chapters on China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, the 2026 document, which was presented on March 18, includes chapters on regions, such as Europe-Eurasia, Asia and the Middle East rather than country profiles. The 2025 assessment looked at Russia through perhaps, a more comprehensive analytical lens, emphasizing the broad‑spectrum threats posed by Russia to U.S. global interests. By contrast, the 2026 assessment of Russia is more dispersed across thematic and regional categories. The sheer amount of space the annual document dedicates to examining Russia has also diminished. While the 2025 document included 152 references to Russia, the 2026 document included only 99 such references (see Table 1). The three other countries to which the 2025 document dedicated separate chapters, (China, Russia, Iran1 and North Korea,) also saw their number of references decrease in the 2026 document. References to China and its leaders declined from 148 in 2025 to 98 in 2026; references to Iran decreased from 65 explicit mentions in 2025 to 51 in 2026; and references to North Korea and its leader fell from 59 in 2025 to 41 in 2026. Unsurprisingly, both assessments point to cooperation within this quartet as a cause for major concern for the United States.
Several other changes stand out in the 2026 document compared to its predecessor. Crucially, Russia-related escalation risks are sharpened, evolving from “unintended escalation” in 2025 to explicit concern about both inadvertent and deliberate escalation, including a direct conflict with NATO, in the 2026 document (see Table 2 for more detailed language). In fact, “the most dangerous threat posed by Russia to the U.S. is an escalatory spiral in an ongoing conflict such as Ukraine or a new conflict that led to direct hostilities, including nuclear exchanges,” according to the 2026 document.2
Some of the 2025 document’s key Russia-related propositions have undergone no drastic changes, however, in the 2026 document. For instance, both assessments posit that Russia is gaining “the upper hand” in the war against Ukraine, the number of references to which decreased from 41 in ATA-2025 to 30 in ATA-2026 (including references to its leadership). In addition, both documents claim that Russia’s losses have not undermined its battlefield capabilities in the war against Ukraine, with the 2026 document asserting that “even with wartime attrition, Russia’s ground forces have grown” and that “despite recruitment challenges, Russia has regularly generated sufficient personnel.” Importantly, the 2026 document assesses that “Moscow almost certainly remains confident that it will prevail on the battlefield in Ukraine and force a settlement on its terms.”
| Issue | Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community in 2025 | Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community in 2026 |
|---|---|---|
| Strategic overview | "Russia views its ongoing war in Ukraine as a proxy conflict with the West, and its objective to restore Russian strength and security in its near abroad against perceived U.S. and Western encroachment has increased the risks of unintended escalation between Russia and NATO." "Regardless of how and when the war in Ukraine ends, Russia’s current geopolitical, economic, military, and domestic political trends underscore its resilience and enduring potential threat to U.S. power, presence, and global interests." "President Vladimir Putin appears resolved and prepared to pay a very high price to prevail in what he sees as a defining time in Russia’s strategic competition with the United States, world history, and his personal legacy." |
"Russia views itself as a key geostrategic competitor of the U.S. and seeks a multipolar world order in which Russia reaches and maintains a privileged position, equal to that of the U.S. and other great powers, including China." "Russia is trying to reshape global politics, frequently at U.S. expense, and seeks to restore its sphere of influence and prevent further NATO expansion in the former Soviet space, especially Ukraine." "Russia probably will continue selectively confronting the U.S. and its partners globally with its full range of capabilities where it sees opportunities to gain an advantage." |
| Escalation and nuclear risk | "Russia views its ongoing war in Ukraine as a proxy conflict with the West... has increased the risks of unintended escalation between Russia and NATO." "The resulting heightened and prolonged political-military tensions between Moscow and Washington, coupled with Russia’s growing confidence in its battlefield superiority and defense industrial base and increased risk of nuclear war, create both urgency and complications for U.S. efforts to bring the war to an acceptable close." |
"The continuation of the war increases the risk of both inadvertent and deliberate escalation to direct conflict between Russia and NATO forces." "Similarly, Russia’s use of nuclear threats and combat use of dual-capable intermediate range ballistic missile systems in Ukraine raises the specter of a regional conflict expanding to an existential threat to the Homeland." |
| WMD, chemical weapons and arms control | "Russia’s advanced WMD and space programs threaten the Homeland, U.S. forces, and key warfighting advantages." "Russia has the largest and most diverse nuclear weapons stockpile." "Russian forces almost certainly continue using chemicals against Ukrainian forces, with hundreds of reported attacks occurring since late 2022." |
"Russia has the largest and most diverse nuclear weapons stockpile and is modernizing its nuclear weapons capabilities in the face of multiple failed tests of new systems." "Russia’s scientists continue developing new CBW capabilities. Its intelligence services have used Novichok nerve agents twice since 2018 in assassination attempts, and its military has used chemicals in thousands of attacks against Ukrainian forces since 2022." "Since the start of its war in Ukraine, Russia has levied nuclear threats against the U.S. and NATO, declared that it deployed nuclear weapons in Belarus, and unilaterally suspended its data exchanges required by the New START Treaty." |
| War with Ukraine | "Russia in the past year has seized the upper hand in its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and is on a path to accrue greater leverage to press Kyiv and its Western backers to negotiate an end to the war that grants Moscow concessions it seeks." "Continuing the Russia-Ukraine war perpetuates strategic risks to the United States of unintended escalation to large-scale war, the potential use of nuclear weapons, heightened insecurity among NATO Allies, particularly in Central, Eastern, and Northern Europe, and a more emboldened China and North Korea." "This grinding war of attrition will lead to a gradual but steady erosion of Kyiv’s position on the battlefield, regardless of any U.S. or allied attempts to impose new and greater costs on Moscow." |
"During the past year, Russia has maintained the upper hand in its war against Ukraine and sees little reason to stop fighting so long as its forces continue to gain ground." will prevail on the battlefield in Ukraine and force a settlement on its terms." |
| Military capabilities and force generation | "Russia’s sizable ground force losses in the war have done little to undermine the strategic pillars of its military power, to include its diverse and robust nuclear deterrent and asymmetric capabilities, particularly in counterspace and undersea warfare." "Russia’s air and naval forces remain intact, with the former being more modern and capable than at the start of the invasion." "The war in Ukraine has afforded Moscow a wealth of lessons regarding combat against Western weapons and intelligence in a large-scale war." |
"Even with wartime attrition, Russia’s ground forces have grown, and its air and naval forces are intact and arguably more capable than before the full-scale invasion." "Russia has advanced systems, including counterspace weapons, hypersonic missiles, and undersea capabilities designed to negate U.S. military advantages." "Despite recruitment challenges, Russia has regularly generated sufficient personnel to replenish losses and create new units to sustain attacks on multiple frontline axes." |
| Defense industry | "Russia has shown it can navigate substantial economic challenges resulting from the ongoing drains of the war, Western cost imposition, and high inflation and interest rates, for at least the near term by using financial and import substitution workarounds, maintaining low debt, and continuing investments in the defense-industrial base." "Russia’s economy remains the fourth largest in the world (based on GDP at purchasing power parity)." |
"Russia is likely to remain resilient against Western sanctions and export controls, although at the cost of expanding budget deficits and underinvestment in the civilian economy that increase the risk of long-term economic stagnation and deepening dependence on China." "Moscow’s rising defense spending and investments in defense-industrial capacity will continue to enable a high level of production of critical capabilities - such as artillery, long-range missiles, one-way attack UAVs, and glide bombs - and ensure Russia retains a firepower advantage over Ukraine." |
| Arctic |
"Russia controls about half of all Arctic coastline and views the region as essential to its economic well-being and national security."
"Russia’s interest in Greenland is focused mainly on its proximity to strategically important naval routes between the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans - including for nuclear-armed submarines - and the fact that Greenland hosts a key U.S. military base." |
"Russia has the largest Arctic coastline and views itself as part of the neighborhood. Russia is our primary challenge in the Arctic as it aims to further its interests in the region as part of broader global balance-of-power competition." "The bulk of Russia’s Arctic forces are concentrated in the Kola Peninsula, which hosts about two-thirds of Russia's second-strike nuclear capabilities." |
| Space and antisatellite capabilities | "Russia is developing a new satellite meant to carry a nuclear weapon as an antisatellite capability." "A nuclear detonation in outer space could cause devastating consequences for the United States, the global economy, and the world in general." "Moscow uses its and others’ civil and commercial remote-sensing satellites to supplement military-dedicated capabilities and has warned that other countries’ commercial infrastructure in outer space used for military purposes can become a legitimate target." |
"China has eclipsed Russia as the key U.S. competitor in space." "Russia remains a capable space power, even while its space industry suffers from systemic underfunding, quality control issues, international sanctions, and export controls." "Russia is developing a new satellite meant to carry a nuclear weapon as an antisatellite capability. A nuclear detonation in outer space would harm all countries’ national security and commercial satellites and infrastructure." |
| Technology and AI | "While Russia’s S&T ecosystem has been constrained in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine, Moscow continues to deploy nascent AI applications on and off the battlefield and has deepened technical cooperation with partners such as China in support of long-term R&D goals." "Russia is using AI to create highly-capable deepfakes to spread misinformation, conduct malign influence operations, and stoke further fear." "Russia has also demonstrated the use of AI-enabled antidrone equipment during its ongoing conflict with Ukraine." |
"The space domain is becoming increasingly contested, with China and Russia developing counterspace capabilities to challenge our own space efforts and U.S. dominance more generally." "In spite of the growing proliferation of one-way attack UAVs that perform missile-like functions... Russia will continue to prioritize advanced missiles that can threaten the U.S." |
| Cyber and gray zone tools | "Russia will continue to be able to deploy anti-U.S. diplomacy, coercive energy tactics, disinformation, espionage, influence operations, military intimidation, cyberattacks, and gray zone tools to try to compete below the level of armed conflict and fashion opportunities to advance Russian interests." | "Cyber actors from China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and ransomware groups will continue to pose critical threats to U.S. networks and critical infrastructure." "Russia poses a persistent, advanced cyber attack and foreign intelligence threat." "Russia’s gray zone tools include cyber attacks, disinformation and influence operations, energy market manipulation, military intimidation, and sabotage." |
| Adversarial cooperation | "Cooperation among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea has been growing more rapidly in recent years... Russia’s war in Ukraine has accelerated these ties." "Russia has been a catalyst for the evolving ties... Moscow has strengthened its military cooperation with other states, especially Pyongyang and Tehran." "The PRC is providing economic and security assistance to Russia’s war in Ukraine... China’s support has improved Russia’s ability to overcome material losses in the war." |
"Selective cooperation among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea... is bolstering the threat that each of them poses to the U.S." "China’s economic support for Russia and Iran and their increasing trade has helped Moscow and Tehran to each withstand U.S.-led international sanctions." "North Korea’s and Iran’s military support to Russia have helped Moscow in its war against Ukraine." |
| China’s and North Korea’s support for Russia | "For at least a decade, Beijing and Moscow have used high-profile, combined military activities primarily to signal the strength of the China-Russia defense ties. This relationship has deepened during the Russia-Ukraine war, with China providing Russia dual-use equipment and weapons components to sustain combat operations." "North Korea has sent munitions, missiles, and thousands of combat troops to Russia to support the latter’s war against Ukraine." |
"China’s engagement with Russia substantially strengthens Moscow’s ability to sustain the war in Ukraine and resist external pressure." "China’s imports of Russian oil and natural gas provide key sources of revenue for Moscow... China’s exports of dual-use goods and technology to Russia help sustain Moscow’s defense production." "In 2024, North Korea deployed more than 11,000 troops to Russia to support combat operations in Kursk." |
| Russia’s challenges and position in Europe-Eurasia | "Even as Russia has proven resilient, it faces a myriad of challenges to remaining an indispensable global player, maintaining a sphere of influence, and upholding stability at home." "Russia’s military has suffered more casualties in Ukraine than in all of its other wars since World War II (750,000-plus dead and wounded), and its economy faces significant long-term macroeconomic headwinds and is increasingly dependent on China." "Russia’s aggression has strengthened European unity and prompted Finland and Sweden to join NATO." |
"Most European countries regard Russia as their greatest and most enduring adversary." "Russia retains the capability to selectively challenge U.S. interests globally by military and nonmilitary means. Its robust, advanced conventional and nuclear forces are an enduring threat to the Homeland, U.S. allies and partners, and U.S. forces abroad." "The most dangerous threat posed by Russia to the U.S. is an escalatory spiral in an ongoing conflict such as Ukraine or a new conflict that led to direct hostilities, including nuclear exchanges." |
Simon Saradzhyan is the founding director of Russia Matters. Opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author.
Saradzhyan, Simon. “US Intel on Russia: Less Attention, But Greater Concern Over Escalation.” Russia Matters, March 19, 2026
The full text of this publication is available via Russia Matters.
