Asia & the Pacific

Wedge strategy theory explains how states use strategic arms control to divide adversaries by affecting their trust, threat perceptions, and beliefs about a commitment’s trade-offs. Examining three landmark arms control negotiations shows how the wedge motive was a key component to these negotiations.

Tongfi Kim and Andrew Taffer respond to Ketian Zhang’s summer 2019 article, “Cautious Bully: Reputation, Resolve, and Beijing's Use of Coercion in the South China Sea.”

Henry Kissinger warns that many existing domestic and international institutions that have helped govern the past decades will not survive the Covid-19 crisis. He is surely correct.

In the context of the South China Sea, China uses coercion primarily to maintain its reputation vis-à-vis other states, but remains aware of the potential costs of its actions.

Contrary to the conventional wisdom, China is a cautious bully that seeks to balance between the need to establish resolve and the economic cost of coercion, seen through its territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

Liberal market-oriented states are in a natural alliance to preserve and protect a global order that is systematically buttressing states’ embrace of market-oriented norms and values.

Capital Choices analyzes the creation of different SWFs from a comparative political economy perspective, arguing that different state-society structures at the sectoral level are the drivers for SWF variation. Juergen Braunstein focuses on the early formation period of SWFs, a critical but little understood area given the high levels of political sensitivity and lack of transparency that surround SWF creation. Braunstein’s novel analytical framework provides practical lessons for the business and finance organizations and policymakers of countries that have created, or are planning to create, SWFs.