Atomic advice: Leaders, advisers, and nuclear decision-making

How do advisers shape nuclear decision-making? A recent surge in literature has debated the relative importance of leaders versus advisers in determining foreign policy choices, often focused on the flow of information between them. Questions remain, however, about how advisers form their positions and the conditions under which leaders take their advice. We introduce a two-level theory of adviser influence, where advisers’ opinions are not fixed positions driven by pre-existing beliefs but by constant reassessment of evolving systemic pressures. Meanwhile, leaders filter adviser inputs through the anticipated domestic costs and opportunities of the policy choice. To evaluate the theory, we conduct a mixed-methods analysis of US Cold War nuclear decision-making. This includes case studies of nuclear force posture decisions with the same groups of advisers over time. Using process-tracing, we examine how new Soviet leadership shifted advisers’ threat assessments and informed Reagan’s positions on nuclear posture and arms control. We also assess how the shift from Kennedy to Johnson reshaped domestic cost calculations and perceptions of the legitimacy of arms racing. This paper offers a novel approach to bureaucratic politics and nuclear strategy, shedding light on decision-making mechanisms that shape foreign and security policy.