Speaker: Kunal Singh, Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
Frequent India-Pakistan crises in this century have provided data points for analyzing the drivers of military escalation between two nuclear-armed states locked in an intense security competition. The similar nature of the crises, beginning with violence by non-state actors with varying degrees of linkage to the Pakistani state, provides a basis for comparing India’s evolving response over a period of more than two decades.
Over this period, India has looked for options in the realm of conventional conflict to punish Pakistan for its support of sub-conventional warfare. This search started with a variety of ground-invasion plans and has culminated in the use of precision standoff weapons.
Building on Thomas Schelling’s work on limited war under the nuclear shadow, this speaker argues that India’s use of precision standoff capabilities can be explained by the superior ability of such weapons to impose costs while remaining below the adversary’s nuclear threshold. He compares precision standoff weapons with other ground and air warfare options in this regard and demonstrates that India’s defense acquisition is tilting toward the former. He also discusses the non-negligible risks of nuclear escalation that nevertheless remain and outlines the exact pathways that could lead to a catastrophe.
Admittance is on a first come–first served basis. Tea and Coffee Provided.
This project is being co-authored with Dr. Yogesh Joshi, of the University of Central Florida.
