The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”
Stephen Herzog is an Associate of the Project on Managing the Atom (MTA) at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He is based at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich, where he is a Senior Researcher in Nuclear Arms Control. Stephen is drafting a book manuscript about multilateral nuclear arms control and has several other ongoing projects on nuclear deterrence and proliferation. His research draws on archival studies, elite interviewing, and survey experiments.
Prior to joining CSS, Stephen was a Research Fellow with MTA. He holds a Ph.D. with distinction in Political Science from Yale University, an M.A. in Security Studies from Georgetown University, and a B.A. in International Relations from Knox College. Before returning to academia, Stephen worked for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration and the Federation of American Scientists.
Stephen's research has been published in the Journal of Politics, International Security, Energy Research & Social Science, the Nonproliferation Review, and the Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament. His public affairs commentary has been featured in outlets including Arms Control Today, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the Financial Times, The National Interest, War on the Rocks, and the Washington Post/Monkey Cage.Last Updated: Sep 7, 2021, 4:11pm