ABSTRACT
Central to the “beyond nuclear deterrence” research agenda is a question rarely treated as legitimate in most nuclear-armed states: Under what conditions can perceived international and state security rest on something other than nuclear threats? To this end, we analyze several findings from the research produced by the Beyond Nuclear Deterrence (BND) Working Group. This research emphasizes the many ways in which nuclear deterrence is historically contingent, gendered, and politically constructed rather than natural or permanent. Its promised strategic stability is likely brittle during times of crisis, rapid technological change, and climate stress. This line of inquiry also proposes pathways that can, in fact, reduce reliance on nuclear weapons.
Additionally, we provide a reflexive analysis of how broader theoretical and methodological fault lines influence efforts aimed at rethinking nuclear deterrence. The BND Working Group brought together 31 scholars from 21 countries with widely varying scholarly traditions, research methods, and policy viewpoints regarding how and when to pursue nuclear disarmament. Managing differences within this community is itself part of the process of building serious policy alternatives and new academic knowledge. Furthermore, we outline future research priorities for diminishing the salience of nuclear weapons and imagining a durable post-nuclear-deterrence order.
