Dual-Track Nuclear Disarmament: Institutional Design of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

ABSTRACT

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)—popularly known as the Nuclear Ban Treaty, or simply the Ban Treaty—marks a sea change in multilateral nuclear arms control. Whereas many past accords sought to achieve their core objectives upon entry into force, the TPNW is different. The two-part strategy of ban advocates combines a stigmatization campaign with institution building to facilitate disarmament over time. This article explains why this approach required an institutional design that departs from earlier treaties. The central question is straightforward: How is the TPNW institutionally different, and what does that mean for judging its success? The new model represented by the treaty elevates the role of civil society and operates on a longer time horizon than traditional nuclear agreements. Critiques of the Ban Treaty for lacking verification mechanisms, for so far failing to eliminate warheads, or for facing opposition from nuclear-armed states usually fundamentally misread the model. Whether the TPNW will ultimately result in nuclear disarmament remains to be seen. But there are analytical shortcomings in judging a novel disarmament architecture by the standards of the very system of nuclear governance it seeks to reorient.