Science, Technology, and Public Policy

This timely book examines comprehensively the drivers of and constraints on a prospective nuclear revival and its likely nature and scope. Of special interest are developing countries which aspire to have nuclear energy and which currently lack the infrastructure, experience, and regulatory structures to successfully manage such a major industrial enterprise. The Fukushima disaster has made such considerations even more pertinent: if a technologically sophisticated country like Japan has difficulties dealing with nuclear safety and security how much harder would it be for a newcomer to the technology.

Associate Professor of Public Policy and Project on Managing the Atom Co-Principal Investigator Matthew Bunn provides a comprehensive assessment of global efforts to secure and consolidate nuclear stockpiles, and a detailed action plan for securing all nuclear materials in four years.  Securing the Bomb 2010 was commissioned by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). The full report, with additional information on the threat of nuclear terrorism, is available for download on the NTI website.

Jeffery Lewis examines patterns in Chinese defense investments, strategic force deployments, and arms control behavior to assess China's nuclear strategy.

For more than a century, energy and its procurement have been central to the U.S. position as a world power.

Russia has recently approved legislation allowing it to offer to import foreign spent fuel for storage, reprocessing, or even disposal in Russia. This represents a potentially dramatic development in the decades-long history of efforts to establish internationally collaborative approaches to management of spent fuel and nuclear wastes.

This paper will discuss how much nuclear transparency China can afford to adopt in light of the changing international security context. The work will examine China''s attitude toward nuclear transparency; the possible influence of high-resolution satellite imagery on China''s position; what sorts of nuclear transparency China could accept under international arms control and nonproliferation treaties; and what kind of on-site inspections China could accept at its specific nuclear production facility and site under an FMCT.