Belfer Experts Comment on the Framework Iran Agreement

The recently announced framework agreement between the P5+1 and Iran regarding the Iranian nuclear program may herald a potential breakthrough in the difficult nuclear negotiations, but it remains only a framework, with key details still to be filled in. Five members of the Belfer Center's Iran Working Group--Graham Allison, Chuck Freilich, Martin Malin, Payam Mohseni, and William Tobey comment on some of the aspects of the agreement, and its potential regional and international impact.

Graham Allison, director of the Belfer Center and Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at the Harvard Kennedy School:

In the final stages of March Madness, when most readers see a sequence of numbers, they think about their betting card. Consider instead the framework accord reached between the US and its partners and Iran. To what questions are the following the answer: 15,000, 12,000, 10, 5, and 0? 

The first is the answer to the question: How many pounds of low-enriched uranium will be neutralized? The second, 12,000, responds to the question: How many centrifuges will be decommissioned? The third, fourth, and fifth numbers answer: How many months will Iran’s “breakout” timeline to a bomb will be extended? How many bombs’ worth of low-enriched uranium will be neutralized? And how many bombs’ worth of plutonium will Iran able to produce?

If our objective is preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear bomb, if and when this agreement is finalized and implemented, will Iran be a step closer to a bomb, as the Israeli government asserted? Or will Iran take a step back further away from its nuclear goal line? If one analyzes the numbers, the answer is clear.

Chuck Freilich, senior fellow at the Belfer Center and former Deputy National Security Advisor in Israel:

Israel should warmly embrace the agreement as a significant step forward, which greatly reduces the threat Iran poses to it for at least a decade.  The true measure of an international accord is the alternatives; in this case, they are worse.

It is an historic error for Israel to position itself as the leading opponent of a major presidential initiative and to seek to raise the bar by presenting new objectives, such as Iranian recognition of its right to exist and cessation of terrorism. Worthy objectives in their own right, Israel long ago concluded that the nuclear threat was of such overwhelming importance that it should not be tied to other issues. Instead of trying to defeat the deal in Congress, a no win battle that it will lose, Israel should now work closely with the administration to ensure that the remaining issues, some of which are of great importance, such as the timing of sanctions relief, are finalized constructively.

The agreement will leave Iran with much of its nuclear infrastructure intact, Iran has not abandoned its long-term nuclear ambitions and strict monitoring is essential.  Israel, the first country to alert the international community to the Iranian nuclear program over two decades ago, can play an invaluable role in support of the inspections regime. 

Martin Malin, executive director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center:

Critics have said the emerging agreement with Iran is too weak. The P5+1 should have pushed harder, they say, for even fewer centrifuges, phased sanction relief, clearing up questions on possible military dimensions of Iran’s program, and a longer duration.  Let’s assume we’re stuck with an agreement along the lines described by the Obama administration.  Let’s assume further that the Iranians will try to cheat on whatever agreement they make. 

How would a new “cat and mouse” game with Iran unfold, compared to what would take place if we walk away and no agreement is reached?  Under the proposed agreement, life will be a lot harder for Iran in the role of mouse, and easier for the cat. 

Say Iran wants to position itself to go for a bomb by building secret enrichment facilities. Iran might try to import key centrifuge parts through illicit trade networks.  Under the agreement, Iran would need to maneuver around a dedicated procurement channel in which all nuclear-related purchases are monitored; dual-use items detected outside of that channel would be immediately suspect. With no agreement, Iranian procurement will proceed as it has over the past decade under sanctions—during which Iran built most of its current 19,000 centrifuges. Iran could perhaps try avoid imports where possible and build centrifuges for a covert plant using on-the-shelf or indigenously produced components. Under the agreement Iran would be required to allow inspectors into its centrifuge R&D and manufacturing facilities. Without the agreement, centrifuge manufacturing will be unmonitored. If Iran did manage to build a covert enrichment facility, it would need to bring in uranium feedstock to enrich.  Under the deal, Iran will need to place its mining and milling of natural uranium under IAEA safeguards, making diversion of uranium to secret facilities more difficult. No deal?  No safeguards on mining and milling. The same kind of oversight would apply to efforts to build a secret reactor to produce plutonium. And, of course, Iran has reportedly agreed to forego reprocessing irradiated fuel on a permanent basis—but only if there is a deal.

I don’t think the critics are correct when they say a substantially better deal could have been achieved. And I don’t think Iranian cheating is inevitable.  But even if one is wrong on both those points, this deal is better than the alternatives.

Payam Mohseni, director of the Iran Project and fellow of Iran studies at the Belfer Center:

The recent framework attained in Lausanne is significant not only because it provides an important opportunity to resolve the Iranian nuclear stalemate but also because it demonstrates the serious resolve of the Iranian government – from the Supreme Leadership to the Presidency – for reaching an agreement on the nuclear agenda. Criticism of the agreed framework from Iranian hardliners, although present, has been relatively muted inside Iran due to the position of the Supreme Leader, a decision that should be read more as a tactical shift within the Leader’s concept of “heroic flexibility” rather than a strategic shift.  In addition, there are clear signals that Iranian political factions are preparing for the increased competition which will inevitably follow a concluded deal and have their eyes set on the future context of a post-sanctions Iran. If a comprehensive nuclear agreement is reached in June, there will not likely be significant factional differences over its implementation.  Instead, the future of competition within Iran will revolve around 4 axes once a comprehensive agreement is finalized: (1) the relationship between Iran and the United States; (2) the role of Iran in the region; (3) the environment for foreign investment and the future trajectory of the economy; and (4) the future of political reforms.

Among these four arenas, the most important site of future factional competition will be within the economic realm. The broad coalition of elites supporting Rouhani regarding his nuclear mandate will gradually begin to fragment as different networks begin to compete over both economic spoils and the process of shaping future economic policies—both domestically and regarding how Iran is reintegrated in the international economy. A paradoxical situation will thus likely emerge as Rouhani gains societal popularity due to his diplomatic success but simultaneously begins to witness elite erosion as economic differences that had been inhibited and stifled by international sanctions come to the fore with the lifting of sanctions. This phenomenon will have ramifications at the domestic political level as well, especially given the upcoming Iranian parliamentary elections.  It remains to be seen how effectively Rouhani will be able to manage these diverse economic interests at the economic level and consolidate his position in the Iranian political scene. 

Will Tobey, senior fellow at the Belfer Center and former Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security Administration: 

Two surprises pop from the parameters for a Framework Agreement on Iran’s nuclear program announced by the State Department on April 2, 2015.  To its credit, the document is more detailed and constrictive than was foreshadowed by leaks or feared by critics.  Less auspicious, it is not clear that the Islamic Republic agrees to it.  

Rather, Iran agreed to a Joint Statement by its Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and European Union representative Frederica Mogherini, which is far less detailed and constrictive.  Apparently, the sides either could not or did not have enough time to negotiate an agreed document fixing the parameters, and chose instead to issue unilateral “fact sheets” describing their respective understandings of the deal.  The Iranian fact sheet is far less specific than the U.S. effort, and differs from it in key aspects—most notably over whether sanctions relief would be immediate or gradual—eliciting angry tweets from Zarif.

The Framework Agreement also defers the IAEA’s concerns about the “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear program to unspecified “agreed measures.”  Such measures have been promised before—notably by a White House fact sheet on the November 2013 agreement—but the IAEA has yet to receive any satisfaction from Iran on the matter.

What then to make of the “Framework Agreement?”  The immediate bickering over the parameters should give rise to concern that there has not been a meeting of the minds.  The absence of progress on the “possible military dimensions” should raise red flags about the verifiability of an agreement and Tehran’s commitment to implementing it.  And, the incompleteness of the agreement makes unconditional support for it ill advised.  The best we can do is wait and see, while expressing concern that key criteria of effectiveness remain unmet.