Bottling the Nuclear Genie

DECADES AGO, the nuclear genie escaped from the bottle. Recently we learned that even Venezuela, which had sounded rebellious at the recent UN summit, is borrowing the tactic of North Korea and Iran by proposing to start research into peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The problem of Pyongyang and Tehran exposes the paradox among the three pillars of nonproliferation strategy — disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful use of nuclear energy. This year's UN summit failed to address the proliferation of nuclear weapons because UN members could not agree which pillar should be given the priority.

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan describes this gap as a "real disgrace." The world anticipates the "haves" to be guards of the nonproliferation regime, but also expects them to lead by example by reducing their own nuclear arsenals and helping "have-nots" to develop nuclear energy. It is no great wonder that Pyongyang demands denuclearization of the whole Korean Peninsula instead of unilateral denuclearization on the North and that Iran accused Washington of "nuclear apartheid."

The united front of Pyongyang and Tehran poses a greater challenge to the global nonproliferation regime. Though informal allies in their nuclear tug-of-war with the international community, North Korea and Iran are watching and following each other's step. They are drawing upon each other's strategies and lessons, and they are judging how the world's nuclear watchdogs plan to deal with them differently.

Washington, which is in direct confrontation with Pyongyang and Tehran, will find it extremely difficult to maintain a consistent approach toward the two.

The six-party talks agreement has made it clear that the provision of a light water reactor to Pyongyang would be discussed at a later stage. However, recognizing Pyongyang's right to a peaceful nuclear program will make Iran's demand irresistible. It's always hard to apply double standards. The inconvenience in nodding to Pyongyang will halt the denuclearization process on the Korean Peninsula, and delay the resolution of the Iran issue.

Washington has to deal with the alliance in a consistent manner. Thanks to Beijing's efforts in leading the denuclearization talks, the North Korean nuclear issue has become more manageable. Washington also believed that, under the shepherd of its old brother Beijing, Pyongyang is unlikely to go astray. However, manageability does not mean that Washington can ease up on Pyongyang and play hardball against Teheran.

Though agreement was inked to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula this September, how to implement the accord that affords equal importance to verifiable denuclearization and satisfying Pyongyang's security and energy concerns is the real daunting task ahead. Iran is watching and calculating the accord's mirror effect.

Heavy-handedness with Iran will not end its nuclear program. President Ahmajinejad's tough position has expedited the referral of this issue to the UN Security Council for sanctions, warmed up by a resolution of the International Atomic Energy Agency Board accusing Iran of noncompliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Similar IAEA procedures happened to Pyongyang in 2003, but went nowhere because China and Russia objected to sanctions. Iran has threatened to resort to enrichment program should Washington and its allies impose their wills. Whether Russia and China will grant the referral to the UN Security Council is still a question mark. Repeating strategies that failed on Pyongyang will be a dead end.

Negotiations based on confidence-building, reciprocity, and compromise are the best strategy to dissolve the Pyongyang-Tehran alliance. The agreement on a peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is a welcome development and bears useful lessons for resolving the Iran issue. With the next round of North Korean denuclearization talks expected in November, the international community will have an opportunity to develop "best practices" to put the nuclear genie in Pyongyang and Tehran and potential others back into the bottle.

Anne Wu is a research fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government.