China's Nuclear Policy: Changing or Not?

The new defense white paper released by China on April 16 has sparked a debate over whether China is changing its nuclear policy, because this new paper, unlike previous editions, did not reiterate China’s long-standing no-first-use nuclear weapons doctrine. Is China changing its nuclear policy?

Colonel Yang Yujun, a spokesman of China’s Ministry of Defense, answered this question unambiguously during a briefing on April 25. Yang stated that “China repeatedly reaffirms that China has always pursued no-first-use nuclear weapons policy, upholds its nuclear strategy of self-defense, and never takes part in any form of nuclear arms race with any country. The policy has never been changed. The concern about changes of China’s nuclear policy is unnecessary.”

Colonel Yang further explained that this new white paper elaborates clearly the readiness level of the PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF) in peacetime and the conditions under which China would launch a resolute counterattack –if China comes under a nuclear attack. All these details, as Yang stated in the briefing, show exactly that “China is earnestly fulfilling its no-fist-use nuclear pledge.”

Indeed, this new edition does have a major change: its format. Colonel Yang explained that all former white papers (with the same general title “China’s National Defense”) were comprehensive (zonghe xing), and elaborated on China’s nuclear policy in detail in sections on “national defense policy” and “arms control”. But this latest edition for the first time adopts a “thematic” model (zhuanti xing) and focuses specifically on “Diversified Employment of China Armed Forces,” the title of the new white paper, and does not address nuclear policy in detail.

In fact, during the briefing of the publication of the new white paper on April 16, Yang emphasized that China would in the future alternate publishing “comprehensive” and “thematic” white papers. It can be expected that in the next comprehensive report, the nuclear policy will be back again as before.

Why did China adopt the thematic model for the latest white paper? Major General Chen Zhou, a drafter of all of China’s defense white papers and professor of the PLA’s Academy of Military Science, explained in an interview on April 16 that, “the contents of comprehensive white paper is broad. Given the length limits of the paper and the publication cycle, it is difficult to cover in depth changes in the development of national defense.” But the thematic white paper, as Chen emphasized, has several advantages, including the ability to focus on one subject in greater depth, and to adopt a more flexible publication schedule.

Moreover, this new white paper shows a good trend toward more transparent. It releases publicly for the first time the personnel number of a total strength of PLA Army (PLAA) mobile operational units, the PLA Navy, and the PLA Air Force; the codes and locations of 18 combined corps of PLAA mobile operational units; and the specific missile models of PLASAF including “Dong Feng” ballistic missiles and “Chang Jian” cruise missiles.

While many Western analysts complain that Beijing keeps its nuclear force posture opaque, Beijing believes the transparency of its nuclear strategy and nuclear doctrine is more important than that of the force posture and that the opacity of its force posture can serve to enhance the “deterrence effect” of its small nuclear force. As Professor Hu Side, the former president of the Chinese Academy of Engineering (often called the Chinese Los Alamos), emphasized at a recent conference:

“Among nuclear weapons states, China has pursued a nuclear policy that is the most transparent. Since the first day when China came to own nuclear weapons, China has been committed to no-first-use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances.”

Beijing has maintained its position on arms transparency and states that “arms transparency should observe the fundamental principle that each nation’s security should be undiminished by it.” To enhance transparency, as Major General Chen emphasized in the interview, “ it must be based on political mutual trust and respect each other’s strategic interests, therefore, the genuine development of military transparency is able to arrive.”

While some western security analysts worry about the intention of China’s nuclear modernization program, Chinese nuclear weapons experts emphasize that China’s nuclear modernization and force posture will continue to be guided by its nuclear policy, which is characterized by a no-first-use pledge and a commitment to “minimum nuclear deterrence”.

To reduce the debates over China’s nuclear policy and stabilize the mutual deterrence between Washington and Beijing, both capitals need to conduct more constructive dialogues. In particular, increasing transparency and developing mutual confidence-building measures would certainly contribute to stabilizing the nuclear relationship between them, which is in everyone’s interests.

As Beijing develops more confidence about the survivability of its small nuclear force through deployment of road-mobile missiles and moving missiles underground and deployment of new generation SLBMs, it might be the time for Beijing to be open more about its nuclear programs. In fact, to promote Washington and Moscow to move forward to deeper cuts in their nuclear forces, Beijing will at some point have to reassure both capitals that it will cap its arsenal at a low level, perhaps 200 warheads; and under some conditions, declare the quantities of its nuclear arsenals and fissile materials stocks.