Journal Article - Contemporary Security Policy
Coercive Disclosure: The Weaponization of Public Intelligence Revelation in International Relations
Abstract
Can intelligence serve as a coercive instrument in international relations? While coercion literature mostly addresses military and economic means, this article argues that coercion can also include the deliberate public disclosure of intelligence. Intelligence can be employed to threaten adversaries, reduce their latitude, and force them to adjust their plans and operations. Additionally, intelligence disclosure can be used to mobilize domestic and international audiences and make others align with a certain narrative and alter their policies accordingly. Still, coercive disclosure can fail or succeed only partially against a determined opponent or a target that is resilient to public and international pressure. To demonstrate the workings of coercive disclosure, we analyze Israel's campaign, beginning in 2017, against the Lebanese Hezbollah's missile manufacturing program and Turkey's coercive campaign vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia and the United States following Jamal Khashoggi's assassination in 2018.
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For Academic Citation:
Riemer, Ofek and Daniel Sobelman. "Coercive Disclosure: The Weaponization of Public Intelligence Revelation in International Relations." Contemporary Security Policy, (2023).
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Abstract
Can intelligence serve as a coercive instrument in international relations? While coercion literature mostly addresses military and economic means, this article argues that coercion can also include the deliberate public disclosure of intelligence. Intelligence can be employed to threaten adversaries, reduce their latitude, and force them to adjust their plans and operations. Additionally, intelligence disclosure can be used to mobilize domestic and international audiences and make others align with a certain narrative and alter their policies accordingly. Still, coercive disclosure can fail or succeed only partially against a determined opponent or a target that is resilient to public and international pressure. To demonstrate the workings of coercive disclosure, we analyze Israel's campaign, beginning in 2017, against the Lebanese Hezbollah's missile manufacturing program and Turkey's coercive campaign vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia and the United States following Jamal Khashoggi's assassination in 2018.
Want to Read More?
The full text of this publication is available via Contemporary Security Policy.Riemer, Ofek and Daniel Sobelman. "Coercive Disclosure: The Weaponization of Public Intelligence Revelation in International Relations." Contemporary Security Policy, (2023).
- Recommended
- In the Spotlight
- Most Viewed
Recommended
Journal Article - Cooperation and Conflict
Re-conceptualizing Triangular Coercion in International Relations
Journal Article - Texas National Security Review
What's Old Is New Again: Cold War Lessons for Countering Disinformation
Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security
Learning to Deter: Deterrence Failure and Success in the Israel-Hezbollah Conflict, 2006–16
In the Spotlight
Most Viewed
Analysis & Opinions - Foreign Policy
Who Will Invade Brazil to Save the Amazon?
Paper - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School
Elements of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy