The domestic implications of the interim deal for Iran

The interim agreement on Iran’s nuclear program holds important implications not only for international security and global affairs but for domestic Iranian politics as well.  The deal has preserved and broadened the support base of President Hassan Rouhani’s administration—one that was already the most plural and cross-factional in the history of the revolution.  It has also furthered the rebalancing of the Iranian elite toward moderate political forces and kept open the door for the possibility of meaningful economic and political reforms in the future.  How this transformative process unfolds though will largely depend on both the developments that occur regarding a final nuclear deal as well as the political fissures and interplay among the elite and the populace.  The domestic implications of a final comprehensive settlement, however, would be tremendous.

The speed with which the interim deal was reached within the first 100 days of Rouhani’s presidency—an important political benchmark domestically—was astonishing.  Reaching an international agreement significantly boosted the credibility of the new administration to put its slogans into action and psychologically made many Iranians optimistic about the future of their country’s development.  Importantly, it demonstrated the government’s political will and ability to forge a deal on the nuclear program that would alter Iran’s relations with the outside world and that would, at the same time, secure the country’s domestic enrichment capabilities and nuclear energy program.  The fact that the United States (and the P5+1) acquiesced to Iran’s continued domestic enrichment in contrast to previous negotiating positions, including UN Security Council resolutions, bolsters Iranian readings of the deal.

Despite a few critical voices, the agreement has been largely hailed as a victory and viewed in a positive light within Iran across the political spectrum.  While criticisms exist among the hardliners over the terms of the interim agreement—for example, over the amount of the 20% enriched uranium stockpile that should be neutralized or the stipulation that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”—there is nevertheless general approval that the deal was made and widespread belief that negotiations should proceed.

There are a range of possible explanations why the interim deal has garnered the support of many hardliners, whether explicitly or implicitly.  These include the direct support and backing of the Supreme Leader for the deal as part of a strategy of “heroic flexibility” with the West, a genuine attempt to resolve the nuclear issue and normalize Iranian relations to the outside world, and the intent to bring about an end to the international sanctions regime either through striking a comprehensive agreement or by gradually eroding the international consensus on the sanctions.

The unity of voices over the agreement, however, also represents an important political move domestically.  It signifies a concerted effort by the establishment to overcome the highly divisive and corrosive predicament within the ruling elite following the contested 2009 presidential election.  The degree of factional in-fighting, conflicts, and divisions had been at their highest point over the last four years.  The election of Rouhani and the subsequent resumption of nuclear negotiations, particularly reaching an agreement on the interim deal, enabled the Islamic Republic to significantly shore up its domestic legitimacy and attempt to overcome and heal its social and political wounds.  Moreover, given that these events would boost public morale and generate national euphoria, it was certainly a prudent decision by the hardliners to join the momentum for change and sway with public opinion.  Elements within the hardliners who are truly opposed to a deal may be pinning their hopes on outsiders in the United States, Israel and Saudi Arabia to scuttle a final deal for them, thus saving them the costs associated with being a spoiler.

Nevertheless, this current state of unity over the interim deal masks underlying differences and tensions that continue to exist within the ruling elite—tensions over a final comprehensive nuclear agreement and the possibility and parameters of domestic reform.  At the moment, however, Rouhani’s domestic leverage has been empowered by his success on the international stage.  He will likely use this opportunity to focus on reviving the economy and planning how to proceed with sensitive economic reform.  The administration will be constrained not just by vested economic interests but, perhaps more importantly at this stage, the possibility of societal backslash in the face of painful economic decisions, such as whether to partially slash subsidy handouts.

In addition to economic reforms, political and social reforms also stand at the heart of Rouhani’s plans.  After the interim nuclear deal was achieved and his first 100 days were over, Rouhani released the first draft of a new civil rights charter that he had pledged to create as part of his electoral campaign promises.  It represents the administration’s goal to not only ease social restrictions and protect individual privacy but to alleviate the domestic “security” environment.  The reduction of international tensions and the resolution of Iran’s nuclear file is a key component of Rouhani’s strategy to change the domestic climate and allow for greater political and cultural openness. 

For the time being, Rouhani will move cautiously yet adamantly down the path of limited reform.  The interim agreement will enable the president to do so, thus reserving the possibility of more significant reforms in the future if a final deal is achieved.  The interim agreement is therefore significant not only because of its potential to change Iran’s role in the Middle East but also to instigate domestic reform within the Islamic Republic as well.