Research, ideas, and leadership for a more secure, peaceful world
Author
Jennifer Weeks
Iran and North Korea are high-priority targets of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy, but the United States is taking strikingly different approaches: engagement with North Korea, denial toward Iran. Each policy is controversial in its own right; viewed together, these initiatives are more problematic. The United States proposes to supply light-water reactors (LWRs) to North Korea --which has been found by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to be in violation of its safeguards commitments— while urging an international nuclear embargo on Iran, a member in good standing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) according to the IAEA.1
This paper finds that nuclear engagement with North Korea is a risky but defensible nonproliferation strategy. Conversely, it argues that U.S. efforts to isolate Iran and prevent it from acquiring peaceful nuclear technology are unlikely to succeed. Instead, the United States should work with Russia, which has important leverage as Tehran''s only significant nuclear supplier. If Moscow limits nuclear trade with Iran to safeguarded light-water reactors and secures significant nonproliferation commitments from Tehran, the United States should offer commensurate rewards to Russia, such as negotiation of an agreement for civilian nuclear cooperation and increased roles in international nuclear joint ventures.
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IRAN AND NORTH KOREA:
TWO TESTS FOR U.S. NUCLEAR COOPERATION POLICY
Jennifer Weeks
Harvard University
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
(617)495-5663
I. U.S. NUCLEAR SUPPLY POLICY
1. Guidelines
The United States has two central obligations as a nuclear supplier under the NPT: to refrain from helping other states to acquire nuclear weapons, and to offer signatories access to peaceful nuclear technology as long as this does not promote nuclear proliferation. At the domestic level, U.S. nuclear cooperation conditions are outlined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA). Key requirements for trade with non-nuclear weapon states under the NNPA include full-scope safeguards on all nuclear activities within the recipient country, and use of U.S. exports and materials produced with them solely for peaceful purposes.
The NNPA bars nuclear cooperation with non-nuclear weapons states that detonate a nuclear explosive device; terminate or violate an IAEA safeguards agreement; or engage in activities involving uranium or plutonium and having direct significance for weapons production. The act also forbids nuclear trade with any nation that assists a non-nuclear weapons state to engage in activities involving uranium or plutonium and having direct significance for nuclear weapons production. If a country has provided such assistance in the past, the President must certify that it has taken steps to stop.
2. The Role of Nuclear Trade in U.S.
Nonproliferation Policy
Since it initiated the Atoms for Peace program in the 1950s, the United States has offered nuclear cooperation as an incentive for recipient countries to make nonproliferation commitments. This linkage was reasonably effective through the mid-1970s, while the United States dominated the international nuclear market. A number of countries signed the NPT and accepted full or partial safeguards on their nuclear programs; in several cases, access to U.S. technology was a factor in nations'' decisions not to develop nuclear weapons.2
As other suppliers gained increasing shares of international nuclear trade through the 1970s, U.S. market power decreased. At the same time, however, U.S. leaders became increasingly concerned about preventing nuclear exports from being diverted to weapons programs, especially after India''s 1974 nuclear test of a bomb fueled with plutonium that India produced using Canadian and U.S. exports.
Other suppliers did not initially share U.S. views on controlling nuclear technologies. From the mid-1970s forward, nuclear trade was a contentious issue between the United States and many of its close allies. It took fifteen years of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic effort to bridge these gaps. Today, however, nearly all major nuclear suppliers regulate growing lists of nuclear and dual-use technologies and materials, and most require full-scope safeguards as a condition for exports. This increasing international consensus on nuclear export standards forces proliferators to choose between maintaining a nuclear option or securing international aid and trade benefits that come only by renouncing the bomb. Mitchell Reiss observes that joining the NPT and/or accepting full-scope safeguards has become "the nonproliferation equivalent of obtaining the good housekeeping seal of approval" for countries seeking to overcome international isolation, and earning this imprimatur was an important motivation for Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa to terminate their nuclear programs and renounce nuclear weapons.3gt;
In sum, the United States has long connected nuclear trade to recipients'' nonproliferation credentials, and has worked hard to build unity among nuclear suppliers. These successes have come at the cost of much controversy with allies, particularly in Europe, who have frequently accused the United States of seeking to impose its own standards on other governments. Current U.S. policies toward North Korea and Iran are the latest friction points in an often-contentious area, and could jeopardize hard-won consensus among nuclear suppliers if they are not resolved favorably.
II. DENUCLEARIZING NORTH KOREA
1. Background
Under the 1994 Agreed Framework, the United States agreed to create an international consortium that will replace North Korea''s graphite reactors with two LWRs. The agreement seeks to end North Korea''s nuclear weapon program, which centered on producing plutonium in the graphite reactors. The IAEA''s discovery of North Korea''s activities in 1993-94 provoked a diplomatic crisis, with Pyongyang threatening to withdraw from the NPT and extract plutonium from its existing spent fuel. Former President Jimmy Carter traveled to North Korea in an effort to avoid the very real possibility of war, and secured commitments that were codified into the Agreed Framework.
In exchange for the LWRs, the Agreed Framework commits North Korea to dismantle its existing reactors and reprocessing facilities and to accept full-scope safeguards on its nuclear activities, as it pledged to do when it joined the NPT in 1985. This process is to take place in phases over several years. In 1995, the international consortium (the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, or KEDO) hired the Korean Electric Power Company (KEPCO) to provide North Korea with two Korean standard nuclear plant model LWRs. The transaction will require U.S. approval because the reactors are based on U.S. designs --Combustion Engineering''s "System 80" and "System 80+" reactors. In addition, South Korea exports major components for these reactors from Combustion Engineering. Under U.S. law, such exports require execution of a government-to-government agreement for cooperation (AFC).
North Korea is not in full compliance with its IAEA safeguards obligations, and thus does not now meet NNPA requirements for nuclear cooperation. Construction of the LWRs will start before North Korea comes into full compliance by opening all of its nuclear sites to IAEA inspections and providing data to verify its initial 1992 declaration of its nuclear activities. North Korea must take these steps "when a significant portion of the LWR project is completed but before delivery of key nuclear components," clearing the way for negotiation of an AFC. Once key components are transferred, Pyongyang is scheduled to start shipping spent fuel rods abroad. After the first reactor is completed, North Korea is scheduled to begin dismantling its graphite reactors and reprocessing plant.
2. Controversy Over Nuclear Cooperation
Critics argue that U.S. nuclear cooperation with North Korea rewards North Korea for violating its NPT safeguards obligations, and undermines the authority of the IAEA by giving North Korea several years before it has to provide information about past nuclear activities and accept further inspections.4 Some note that the LWRs will produce plutonium that is usable for nuclear weapons, although less well-suited than that from the North''s existing graphite reactors; they argue that nuclear reactors make little sense for a poor country with an inadequate power grid, and that coal or gas plants would be more appropriate.5
The issue of nuclear exports briefly came to the fore in late 1997 when ABB-Combustion Engineering applied for a U.S. export license to ship two reactors to North Korea. Critics objected that a license could not be granted in the absence of an AFC with Pyongyang, and argued that if the transaction gained bureaucratic headway, the United States might overlook discrepancies in North Korea''s nuclear record.6 The company withdrew its application, saying it had moved prematurely, but similar arguments are likely to be raised if work on the reactors progresses to the point of shipping major nuclear components.
Supporters of the Agreed Framework contend that because it requires specific actions in a prescribed sequence by North Korea and KEDO, sensitive nuclear technologies will not be shipped until North Korea has come into full compliance with its NPT and IAEA obligations. If the North fails to do so, KEDO can walk away from the deal; North Korea will not have gained any new capabilities, and its nuclear program will have been frozen in the meantime. According to U.S. officials, the Agreed Framework embodies the U.S. commitment to resolve the IAEA''s concerns about North Korea''s nuclear activities. Moreover, it limits North Korea more tightly than the NPT, since the Agreed Framework commits the North to forego reprocessing and dismantle its reprocessing plant.7
Nonetheless, U.S. and IAEA officials have serious concerns about implementation of the agreement. The IAEA fears that North Korea will not preserve information about past nuclear activities which the agency needs to verify Pyongyang''s compliance with its safeguards commitments. The ambiguous timing of steps under the Agreed Framework leading to construction of the reactors and the shutdown of North Korea''s existing facilities offers much scope for delay by either party, and makes it uncertain whether the Agreed Framework will be successfully executed.8 According to the State Department''s Agreed Framework coordinator, construction of the first reactor may have to be suspended for several years while the IAEA carries out its verification mission. This pause is likely to drive up the cost of the reactors and delay shipment of North Korea''s spent fuel abroad.9
III. PREVENTING AN IRANIAN BOMB
1. Background
Iran is a member of the NPT, but the United States charges that it has been working to produce nuclear weapons since the mid-1980s. Concerns center on Iran''s efforts to complete two LWRs at Bushehr, which were originally ordered from Germany and were damaged in the Iran-Iraq war; Iran''s fuel-cycle research and development activities, including laser enrichment and reprocessing; and Iranian attempts to import gas centrifuge enrichment technology, a uranium conversion plant, heavy-water research reactors, and a range of dual-use technologies with nuclear weapons applications.10 Iran also has reportedly tried to buy weapon-usable materials from facilities in the former Soviet Union.11
The United States opposes all nuclear trade with Iran, even completion of the Bushehr LWRs --which is permissible under the NPT, and which Iran plans to place under safeguards— on the grounds that any support will increase Iran''s technical capabilities and may serve as a cover for weapon-related activities. Since the late 1980s U.S. officials have dissuaded Germany, Spain, Argentina, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and Ukraine from selling nuclear technologies to Iran.12 In 1997, China agreed to terminate nuclear cooperation with Tehran as a condition for concluding a U.S.-Chinese AFC. The United States has also sought, unsuccessfully, to prevent the IAEA from providing Iran with technical assistance.13
Russia has resisted U.S. requests to terminate its nuclear cooperation with Iran, and the issue has become a major sore point in U.S.-Russian relations. U.S. concern escalated sharply in 1995, when as part of an agreement to complete the Bushehr reactors, Russia offered to provide gas centrifuge enrichment technology to Iran. Russia backtracked on the centrifuge issue under U.S. pressure, and subsequently pledged to limit its cooperation with Iran to the Bushehr project.
Disagreement persists between U.S. and Russian officials over what Russia''s "nothing but Bushehr" pledge includes. In November 1998, Russia concluded an $800 million contract to complete the original Bushehr reactors and announced plans to bid on three more reactors worth up to $3 billion.14 Russia has committed to training 600 to 700 Iranian nuclear workers in connection with Bushehr, a number that the United States views as far larger than the project requires.15 Further, according to U.S. officials, Russian institutes have continued to work with Iran on broader nuclear technology issues. In January 1999 the United States sanctioned Russia''s Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power Technology (known as Nikiet) and the Mendeleyev University of Chemical Technology for providing assistance to Iran''s nuclear weapons program.16 According to press reports, the centers were negotiating to sell Iran a research reactor and a uranium conversion facility.17
2. Controversy Over Nuclear Cooperation
In contrast to North Korea, the issue posed by Iran is not whether the United States is setting the bar for nuclear trade too low, but too high --i.e., whether its embargo policy contravenes international nuclear trade standards. Russia argues that U.S. officials have not shown convincing proof of an Iranian nuclear weapons program, and further, that since Iran is a member in good standing of the NPT and maintains full-scope safeguards, Russia''s proposed sales are not proliferation risks. Russian officials regularly invoke the fact that the United States is providing LWRs to North Korea while trying to keep Russia from selling them to Iran.
More broadly, Russia views Iran as an important strategic partner. Moscow is strongly committed to cooperation with Iran on a range of energy issues, including development of oil and gas reserves in the Caspian basin (the United States is also trying to constrain Russian activity in this area). U.S.-Russian friction over Iran reflects the fact that Russia''s foreign policy is increasingly driven by economic interests --in particular, Minatom is hard in search of export opportunities— and explicitly seeks to counter post-Cold War U.S. dominance by building up regional powers such as Iran that are not U.S. allies.18
Friction between the United States and Russia over nuclear trade with Iran has impacted other areas of bilateral cooperation:
- The January 1999 sanctions threaten Nikiet''s participation in efforts to upgrade the safety of Russian nuclear power reactors; improve security for its weapon-grade uranium holdings; and convert Soviet-designed research reactors to run on non-weapon-grade uranium fuel.
The United States refuses to conclude an agreement for civilian nuclear cooperation with Russia until the Iran issue is resolved, thereby blocking U.S.-Russian cooperation on issues such as nuclear power sources for space missions and advanced reactor design.19
Since February 1996, Congress has conditioned economic aid to Russia on semiannual certifications that Moscow has terminated nuclear assistance to Iran. Aid has continued under Presidential waivers, but Congress has threatened to cut off the funds or restrict other revenue sources for Russia --such as launching U.S. satellites on Proton rockets— if Russian support to Iran continues.20
Iran has also been a contentious issue in U.S.-European relations since the early 1990s.21 European governments generally favor engagement with Tehran, and in other areas they have adamantly resisted U.S. efforts to prevent foreign investment in Iran. On the nuclear issue, European governments have grudgingly supported U.S. efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring technologies abroad, but recent press reports indicate that several countries --notably Germany— remain interested in supplanting Russia on the Bushehr project if the opportunity arises.22
IV. THE MERITS OF ENGAGEMENT
1. Pros and Cons of Engagement Strategies
U.S. nuclear relations with Iran and North Korea are part of a larger debate over contrasting strategies for dealing with hostile states: engaging and offering incentives for cooperation, or confrontation and containment. Advocates of engagement argue that offering positive incentives communicates a desired response, while sanctions and punitive measures often fail to spell out how the target country can improve relations. Incentives can build constituencies in the recipient country for the desired behavior; in some cases, engagement may draw the recipient into international regimes and cooperative arrangements that require it to change its policies.23
Critics reply that engaging with rogue nations legitimizes and props up governments that might otherwise eventually collapse; may inspire imitation by other states that hope to win similar benefits; and undercuts international regimes, such as the nuclear nonproliferation regime, by creating special standards for countries that flout widely accepted rules. Additionally, offering incentives may convey weak U.S. support for those principles and reduce the credibility of U.S. threats.
Proposals for nuclear cooperation in these cases raise several basic questions:
- Is engagement or containment more likely to prevent Iran and North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons?
What are the relative costs of these strategies, including impacts on U.S. credibility and relations with allies and other nuclear suppliers?
If nuclear cooperation is a reasonable approach, where does it fit in a broader U.S. strategy? Should it be a central element of U.S. policy toward Iran or North Korea?
2. Assessing Engagement with North Korea
It is far from certain that LWRs will be built in North Korea, based simply on the complexities of the timetable and the degree of good faith that will be required from all parties to execute the deal. Other uncertainties include shortfalls in KEDO''s funding and hostile actions by North Korea, such as the August 1998 missile test over the Sea of Japan and concurrent U.S. discovery of a site at Kumchang-ri that was suspected to be a planned underground nuclear weapons facility.24
While the Agreed Framework does not require the United States to violate U.S. legal requirements for nuclear cooperation to supply LWRs to North Korea, it does embody a commitment to provide nuclear technology to a country that currently fails to meet widely-supported international standards for nuclear cooperation, as a means of achieving a policy goal that is far from assured. Successful execution of the Agreed Framework, however, would result in North Korea dismantling its existing reactors and reprocessing plant; shipping abroad some 50,000 kilograms of spent fuel; and accepting full-scope IAEA safeguards. For all of the Agreed Framework''s ambiguities, critics have yet to propose an alternative policy that would achieve these results at anything like a comparable cost.25
Moreover, South Korea --a key U.S. ally— is strongly committed to implementing the LWR deal, engaging the North, and denuclearizing the Korean peninsula.26 Given South Korea''s own past interest in nuclear weapons, this policy is a positive change which the United States should strongly support.
Nonetheless, the LWR deal was never meant to be the sole focus of U.S.-North Korean relations, nor does it address other problems between Washington and Pyongyang. Two points emerge from several recent assessments of U.S. policy toward North Korea. First, the LWR deal is a crucial step toward averting war on the Korean peninsula, but it does not constitute anything like a full engagement strategy. Second, to achieve long-term peace and stability in the region, the United States must articulate such a strategy and do more to fulfill the non-nuclear provisions of the Agreed Framework - including steps to reduce trade sanctions and expand economic and political relations with North Korea.27
As this paper went to press, the United States was moving in this direction. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry visited North Korea in late May to present a comprehensive U.S. proposal that, if implemented, would lead to a lifting of sanctions on the North, in return for steps including the termination of North Korea''s nuclear and missile programs.28 The success or failure of this proposal (and the ensuing U.S. political debate) will almost certainly determine whether the LWR supply deal is completed.
3. Implications for Engaging Iran
There are a number of parallels between U.S. relations with Iran and North Korea, which makes the divergence in respective U.S. policies all the more notable. The United States views both countries as "rogue nations" that undermine the international order by supporting terrorism, threatening U.S. allies in their regions, abusing human rights, and seeking to acquire (and, in North Korea''s case, export) weapons of mass destruction. Each has a long history of tension and conflict with the United States. Each is seeking aid and trade opportunities in an effort to manage a serious economic crisis.
U.S. policy toward Iran''s nuclear program is grounded in the Clinton administration''s "dual containment" initiative, which seeks to isolate and constrain both Iran and Iraq from threatening U.S. allies and interests in the Persian Gulf. Recently, a series of Middle East experts and senior U.S. policymakers have challenged the wisdom of dual containment and argued that engaging Iran would address U.S. concerns more effectively.29 While far from unanimous, this view has gained support since the May 1997 election of President Mohammed Khatami, who is widely viewed as a moderate and has called for dialogue with the United States.30
Iran''s situation offers arguments both for and against nuclear cooperation as an engagement tactic. On the positive side, it is generally agreed that Iran cannot yet produce fissile material or support a nuclear weapons program.31 Tehran has a relatively low sunk cost in its nuclear effort, and so may be more likely now to accept incentives than if its program progresses further.32 Since Iran is sorely in need of foreign investment, the United States could offer a phased lifting of economic sanctions to induce Tehran to make additional nonproliferation commitments.
Conversely, although U.S. officials have made a few cautiously positive statements in response to Khatami, U.S.-Iranian relations are still highly adversarial. Iran would have to raise the stakes considerably to impel Washington to consider an engagement strategy --for example, by threatening to withdraw from the NPT as North Korea did. Iran remains hostile to Israel, which in turn has pressed the United States to curb Russian support for Iran''s nuclear and missile programs.
Iranian and U.S. domestic politics also mitigate against cooperation. Khatami faces a stiff challenge from conservative forces, and could be weakened by too openly embracing the United States, while the U.S. Congress has been the driving force behind recent U.S. sanctions on Iran. Indeed, while it might be logical for the United States to pursue similar strategies toward North Korea''s and Iran''s nuclear programs, it probably is politically impossible to do both at once. The Clinton administration has had to fend off repeated congressional efforts to cut U.S. funding for KEDO, and is unlikely to offer incentives to Iran that would invite similar attacks.
V. REACHING TEHRAN VIA MOSCOW
Instead of direct engagement, the United States should seek to turn Russia''s supply relationship with Iran from a liability to an advantage by working with Moscow to curb Iran''s nuclear weapon activities. Russia is strongly committed to supplying LWRs to Iran, and the United States is in a difficult position arguing against sales that are legal under the NPT. Instead, U.S. leaders should work to persuade Russia to make its LWR-only pledge operational and verifiable, and to limit related activities such as training Iranian personnel to levels commensurate with these projects. Russia should also require Tehran to make significant new nonproliferation commitments in order to receive LWRs.
Germany''s nuclear relationship with Brazil offers an example of effective supplier leverage. In the 1970s and 1980s, Bonn transferred reactor and enrichment technology to Brazil over U.S. objections that Brazil was trying to develop nuclear weapons. In 1990, however, Germany tightened its nuclear export standards to require full-scope safeguards. Bonn subsequently renewed its nuclear cooperation agreement with Brazil, but conditioned further support on Brazil accepting full-scope safeguards. Recounting Germany''s role, Mitchell Reiss notes,
States other than the United States may be more effective in lobbying certain countries . . . . Washington should therefore welcome nonproliferation "burdensharing" with allies that have the same nonproliferation goals.33
Russia has already taken several steps that indicate it understands the nonproliferation concerns surrounding its nuclear trade with Iran. Tehran opposed extension of the NPT in 1995, and was expected to object at the extension conference that it had not received full access to peaceful nuclear technology. Russia helped to pressure Iranian officials not to oppose or set conditions for extension.34 Russia has also stated that it will take back spent fuel from the Bushehr reactors for reprocessing, in response to concerns that Iran might extract plutonium from the fuel for weapons.35 In 1997, then-Minister of Atomic Energy Mikhailov offered to allow U.S. inspectors to visit the site during construction; the United States refused the offer and continued to press Russia to break off all nuclear commerce with Iran.36
Earlier this year, Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeny Adamov offered to terminate Nikiet''s and Mendeleyev University''s work with Iran if the United States would lift sanctions on the two institutes.37 The issue was to be discussed during then-Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov''s March 1999 visit to Washington, which was canceled over U.S. military action in Kosovo. According to current and former Clinton administration officials, the issue remained under discussion between the two governments, but as of early June Russia had not offered assurances that satisfied U.S. concerns.38 In addition to taking back spent fuel from Iran, Russia could require several key nonproliferation steps from Iran as a condition for supply:
- Ratifying the IAEA''s Additional Protocol to safeguards agreements (INFCIRC/540), developed under the agency''s 93+2 Program to strengthen international safeguards. The Protocol was specifically designed to help the IAEA detect clandestine nuclear activities, and if implemented aggressively would greatly increase the agency''s chances of detecting covert weapons activities in Iran.39
Forswearing uranium enrichment and reprocessing, neither of which are essential to a civilian nuclear power program for Iran. The Agreed Framework, which commits North Korea to give up its plutonium activities, offers a useful precedent for such a step.
Accepting additional special IAEA inspections to verify its nonproliferation credentials.
This policy might emulate the Agreed Framework''s sequential approach, with Russia delivering technology (or the United States modifying sanctions) on a predetermined schedule in return for specific commitments.
The United States would have to offer Russia incentives to curb its nuclear commerce with Iran and use its leverage to achieve these nonproliferation conditions. One possibility is negotiation of a U.S.-Russian AFC to permit cooperation on civilian nuclear technology projects. Since U.S. law forbids cooperation with a nation that is helping another country engage in weapon-related activities involving uranium or plutonium, Russia would have to make a verifiable commitment to curb all such activities with Iran. The United States could also facilitate Russian participation in joint ventures with U.S. and European nuclear firms and other energy companies.
Another option would be to offer Russia a role in the nuclear deal with North Korea.40 It is not clear that Russia would be able to win fuel supply contracts from KEDO, since it is not a member of the consortium, has not contributed funds, and has been marginal to developments on the Korean peninsula since its withdrawal of aid to Pyongyang in 1990.41 However, Russia might agree to accept North Korea''s spent fuel at a commercial storage facility, perhaps receiving a premium price to reflect the urgency of getting it out of North Korea.
At some point, U.S.-Iranian relations may improve sufficiently that the United States could consider direct investments in Iran''s energy sector. For example, Geoffrey Kemp suggests a "grand bargain" under which the United States would help Iran build pipelines and other facilities in exchange for a commitment by Tehran to limit its nuclear facilities to one or two LWRs and its existing research reactors.42 Alternatively, if Russian completion of Bushehr drags on, Iran may decide that other energy sources are acceptable, and the United States could supply alternative technology such as natural gas plants. However, such possibilities should not preclude acting now, while Iran''s nuclear program is at a relatively early stage, and before U.S.-Russian tensions over Iran grow worse.
VI. CONCLUSION
North Korea and Iran illustrate some of the uses and limits of nuclear cooperation as an engagement and nonproliferation tool. The LWR supply agreement at least temporarily halted North Korea''s plutonium plans, and if implemented successfully, would significantly reduce the risk of war in one of the most unstable regions of the world. A comparable agreement with Iran might well address enough of Iran''s energy, economic, and security concerns to preclude Tehran from developing a nuclear weapons option.
However, engagement through nuclear trade poses difficulties for the United States at several levels. It threatens to undercut the longstanding and successful U.S. policy of requiring certain minimum nonproliferation credentials as a condition for nuclear trade. Nuclear trade is not a policy for changing the behavior of hostile states, and does not address the broader concerns that typically drive nations to pursue nuclear weapons. If the United States hopes to reduce threats from North Korea or Iran, it will have to engage on a range of issues with governments that are difficult and politically controversial partners.
Nuclear technology, with its potential military uses, is not an obvious starting point for building relations with "rogue" nations known or suspected to be seeking nuclear weapons. North Korea is an exception because Pyongyang insisted on receiving LWRs and forced the situation so close to war that the United States saw no practical alternative. The United States has supported measures such as cultural and athletic exchanges with Iran, but remains committed to containing Iran''s WMD programs.43 Because nuclear trade ranks fairly low among the potential incentives the United States can offer directly to proliferators, it is all the more important to consider working through third countries to influence problem states. By the time U.S.-Iranian relations improve to a point at which Washington might consider offering Tehran incentives to curb its nuclear program, Iran could be much farther down the road to producing nuclear weapons. Russia''s nuclear trade with Iran may be promoting this process, and is seriously complicating U.S.-Russian relations. The United States has little to lose in exploring a nonproliferation "burden-sharing" arrangement with Russia that would address Iran''s activities and reinforce the strong common interest between Washington and Moscow in preventing further proliferation in the Middle East.
REFERENCES
1. U.S. officials contend that each of these policies seeks to reduce proliferation risks: the LWR agreement will provide North Korea with more proliferation-resistant nuclear technology than its existing reactors, while nuclear trade with Iran will build up a new infrastructure, and could potentially provide expertise, material, and a cover for clandestine nuclear weapons activities. 2. See Virginia I. Foran and Leonard S. Spector, "The Application of Incentives to Nuclear Proliferation," and William J. Long, "Trade and Technology Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation," The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention, ed. David Cortright, pp. 22, 25-26, 94-99, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD (1997).
3. Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities, pp. 19-24, 67-70, 331-32, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, DC (1995).
4. North Korea is currently allowing the IAEA to monitor five nuclear facilities where activities are frozen under the terms of the Agreed Framework, but the IAEA will require wider access to additional sites to verify the North''s 1992 declaration of its nuclear activities.5. See, e.g., Henry Sokolski, "Nonproliferation: Faking It and Making It," The National Interest (Spring 1998), and testimony of James R. Lilley before the House Committee on International Relations (March 24, 1999).
6. Mark Hibbs and Margaret L. Ryan, "PWR Export Permit Fiasco Leaves Feasibility of KEDO Deal in Doubt," Nucleonics Week, pp. 1-2 (February 12, 1997).
7. U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Difficulties in Accomplishing IAEA''s Activities in North Korea, pp. 15-16, RCED-98-210, Washington, DC (July 1998).
8. Ibid., pp. 19-20; Richard P. Cronin and Zachary S. Davis, "The U.S.-North Korea Nuclear Accord of October 1994: Background, Status, and Requirements of U.S. Nonproliferation Law," p. 17, Congressional Research Service, Washington DC (April 11, 1997).
9. Joel Wit, "The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization: Achievements and Challenges," The Nonproliferation Review, pp. 67-68 (Winter 1999).
10. Proliferation: Threat and Response, pp. 24-27, office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC (1997); Rodney W. Jones et al., Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998, pp. 169-86, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC (1998).
11. Jones et al., pp. 170-71; William C. Potter, "Before the Deluge? Assessing the Threat of Nuclear Leakage From the Post-Soviet States," p. 12, Arms Control Today (October 1995).
12. Andrew Koch and Jeannette Wolf, "Iran''s Nuclear Facilities: A Profile," p. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA (1998). 13. U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation and Safety: Concerns With the International Atomic Energy Agency''s Technical Cooperation Program, pp. 14-15, 39-41, RCED-97-192, Washington, DC (September 1997).
14. Andrew Jack and Stephen Fidler, "Moscow Asked to Bid for Contract," Financial Times, p. 2 (November 26, 1998).
15. Personal communication with senior U.S. official, June 1999.16. Howard Diamond, "U.S. Sanctions Russian Entities For Iranian Dealings," Arms Control Today, p. 25 (January/February 1999).
17. Fred Wehling, "Russian Nuclear and Missile Exports to Iran," The Nonproliferation Review, pp. 136-37 (Winter 1999).
18. Dimitri Simes, After the Collapse: Russia Seeks Its Place As a Great Power, pp. 201-24, Simon & Schuster, New York (1999); testimony of James Woolsey before the House Committee on International Relations (March 25, 1999).
19. Russia has pressed for an AFC to promote joint work on high technology projects. "Report of the Nuclear Energy Committee," Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation, Washington, DC (January 29-30, 1996).20. Craig Cerniello, "Russian-Iran Ties Remain Issue at Gore-Chernomyrdin Meeting," Arms Control Today, September 1997; press release issued by Sen. Dianne Feinstein, March 22, 1999.
21. Philip H. Gordon, The Transatlantic Allies and the Changing Middle East, pp. 53-71, Adelphi Paper 322, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London (September 1998).
22. Mark Hibbs, "Iran Still Angling for Europeans to Finish Bushehr PWR Station," Nucleonics Week, p. 8 (October 1, 1998); Hibbs, "Reactors-for-Safeguards Deal Offered by Europeans to Iran," Nucleonics Week, p. 1, October 8, 1998. Work on Bushehr has been delayed by modification of the original German-supplied 1,300-megawatt reactor to the Russian VVER-1000 design and Iran''s efforts to force Germany to supply components that Iran purchased years ago.
23. Long, pp. 85-94.24. A U.S. inspection team in May 1998 found that the site contained a huge empty tunnel. The United States will be allowed regular visits to the site to address concerns regarding its future use. Philip Shenon, "Suspected North Korean Atom Site is Empty, U.S. Finds," New York Times (May 28, 1999).
25. See George Perkovich, "The Korea Precedent: A Price Worth Paying For a Safer World," p. A23, Washington Post (September 28, 1994).
26. Kim Dae Jung, "New Challenges for the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia," speech to the Asia Society, New York, NY (June 8, 1998); Hong Soon-young, "Thawing Korea''s Cold War," Foreign Affairs (May/June 1999).
27. Ralph A. Cossa, Monitoring the Agreed Framework: A Third Anniversary "Report Card", Pacific Forum CSIS, Honolulu (October 1997); Managing Change on the Korean Peninsula, pp. 18-20, Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York, NY (1998); Wade Huntley and Timothy L. Savage, "Agreed Framework at the Crossroads," #99-05, Nautilus Institute, Berkeley, CA (1999).
28. David E. Sanger, "U.S. Aide Due in North Korea With Deal to Lift Sanctions," New York Times (May 21, 1999).
29. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft, and Richard Murphy, "Differentiated Containment," Foreign Affairs May/June 1997); Hon. Lee H. Hamilton, "Reassessing U.S. Policy Toward Iran," speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC (April 15, 1998); Gary Sick, "Rethinking Dual Containment," Survival (Spring 1998); Geoffrey Kemp, American and Iran: Road Maps and Realism, The Nixon Center, Washington, DC (1998); Hon. Cyrus R. Vance, "U.S.-Iranian Relations: Has the Time Come?", speech to the Asia Society, New York (January 13, 1999).
30. For more skeptical views, see Patrick Clawson et al, Iran Under Khatami: A Political, Economic, and Military Assessment, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC (1998), and "Next Steps with Iran: A Debate," Middle East Quarterly (June 1998).
31. Proliferation: Threat and Response, p. 26; Andrew Koch and Jeanette Wolf, "Iran''s Nuclear Procurement Program: How Close to the Bomb?," The Nonproliferation Review (Fall 1997).
32. See Foran and Spector, p. 31, for a discussion of the influence of sunk costs.33. Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 61-62, 70.
34. Mark Hibbs, "Russia, Others Pressed Iran Prior to NPT Extension Vote," p. 9, Nucleonics Week (May 22, 1995).
35. "Bushehr Completion By 2002, With Russian Assistance," p. 49, Nuclear News (January 1999). It is not clear how Minatom will square this commitment with a provision in Russian environmental law which forbids storage of foreign radioactive waste on Russian territory.
36. Personal communication with former U.S. official, May 1999. 37. Michael R. Gordon, "Russia to Offer U.S. Deal to End Iran Nuclear Aid," New York Times (March 17, 1999); Sergey Rybak and Margaret L. Ryan, "Adamov Says Iran Asked Russia to Discuss Three More Reactors," p. 16, Nucleonics Week (March 25, 1999).
38. Personal communications, May and June 1999.39. Under the Additional Protocol, Iran would have to declare and provide access to all aspects of its fuel cycle, as well as related research and development activities. This step would make it easier to verify whether Iran is conducting weapon-related activities under the cover of a peaceful use program.40. John C. Baker, Non-Proliferation Incentives for Russia and Ukraine, pp. 75-76, Adelphi Paper 309, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London (May 1997); testimony of Henry Sokolski before the House Committee on International Relations (March 25, 1999).
41. David Reese, The Prospects for North Korea''s Survival, pp. 77-79, Adelphi Paper 323, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London (November 1998); personal communication with official involved in implementing Agreed Framework, May 1999.
42. Kemp, pp. 97-98.43. Madeleine K. Albright, speech to the Asia Society, New York, NY (June 17, 1998); Martin S. Indyk, "U.S. Policy in the Middle East," speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY (April 22, 1999).
ENDNOTES
1 2 See Virginia I. Foran and Leonard S. Spector, "The Application of Incentives to Nuclear Proliferation," and William J. Long, "Trade and Technology Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation," The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention, ed. David Cortright, pp. 22, 25-26, 94-99, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD (1997).
3 Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities, pp. 19-24, 67-70, 331-32, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, DC (1995).
4 5 See, e.g., Henry Sokolski, "Nonproliferation: Faking It and Making It," The National Interest, (Spring 1998), and James R. Lilley, "North Korea: A Continuing Threat," testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, at http://www.aei.org/ct/ctlilley2.htm (March 24, 1999). According to Robert Gallucci, the U.S. negotiator of the Agreed Framework, North Korea insisted on receiving LWRs rather than any other energy source.
6 Mark Hibbs and Margaret L. Ryan, "PWR Export Permit Fiasco Leaves Feasibility of KEDO Deal in Doubt," Nucleonics Week, pp. 1-2, February 12, 1997.
7 U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Difficulties in Accomplishing IAEA''s Activities in North Korea, pp. 15-16, RCED-98-210, Washington, DC (July 1998).
8 Ibid., pp. 19-20; Richard P. Cronin and Zachary S. Davis, "The U.S.-North Korea Nuclear Accord of October 1994: Background, Status, and Requirements of U.S. Nonproliferation Law," p. 17, Congressional Research Service, Washington DC (April 11, 1997).
9 Joel Wit, "The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization: Achievements and Challenges," The Nonproliferation Review, pp. 67-68 (Winter 1999).
10 Ibid.; Andrew Koch and Jeannette Wolf, "Iran''s Nuclear Facilities: A Profile," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA (1998); Mark Hibbs, "Iran Said to be Stepping Up Effort to Support Laser Enrichment," Nuclear Fuel, p. 1 (October 5, 1998).
11 FIND CITE
12 Koch and Wolf, p. 2. 13 U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation and Safety: Concerns With the International Atomic Energy Agency''s Technical Cooperation Program, pp. 14-15, 39-41, RCED-97-192, Washington, DC (September 1997); Mark Hibbs, "IAEA, Russia to U.S.: Go Public in U.N. Bodies or Drop Iran Claim," Nucleonics Week, p. 1, October 9, 1997.
14 Andrew Jack and Stephen Fidler, "Moscow Asked to Bid for Contract," Financial Times, p. 2 (November 26, 1998).
15 16 Howard Diamond, "U.S. Sanctions Russian Entities For Iranian Dealings," Arms Control Today, p. 25 (January/February 1999).
17 Fred Wehling, "Russian Nuclear and Missile Exports to Iran," The Nonproliferation Review, pp. 136-37 (Winter 1999).
18 Dimitri Simes, After the Collapse: Russia Seeks Its Place As a Great Power, pp. 201-24, Simon & Schuster, New York (1999); testimony of James Woolsey before the House Committee on International Relations, in Russian Foreign Policy and Proliferation to Rogue Regimes, hearing (March 25, 1999).
19 Russia has pressed for negotiation of an AFC to promote joint work on these and other high technology projects; see "Report of the Nuclear Energy Committee," Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation, Washington, DC (January 29-30, 1996), at http://www.eia.doe.gov/gorec/necrpt6.html. In April 1998, then-Secretary of Energy Federico Pena stated that Russia''s nuclear cooperation with Iran was "probably the biggest obstacle" to negotiating an AFC. USIS Moscow transcript of press roundtable, Marriott Tverskaya Hotel, Moscow (April 1, 1998). 20 Craig Cerniello, "Russian-Iran Ties Remain Issue at Gore-Chernomyrdin Meeting," Arms Control Today, September 1997; press release issued by Sen. Dianne Feinstein, March 22, 1999.
21 Richard A. Falkenrath, "The United States, Europe, and Weapons of Mass Destruction," Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East, Robert Blackwill and Michael Sturmer, eds., pp. 212-14, 220-28, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (1997); Philip H. Gordon, The Transatlantic Allies and the Changing Middle East, pp. 53-71, Adelphi Paper 322, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London (September 1998).
22 Mark Hibbs, "Iran Still Angling for Europeans to Finish Bushehr PWR Station," Nucleonics Week, p. 8 (October 1, 1998), and "Reactors-for-Safeguards Deal Offered by Europeans to Iran," Nucleonics Week, p. 1, October 8, 1998. Russian work on Bushehr has been delayed by a number of issues, including modification of the original German-supplied [xx]-megawatt reactor to the Russian VVER-1000 design and Iranian efforts to force Germany to supply components that Iran ordered and paid for over a decade ago.
23 [Footnote to Cortright book on incentives.] For a discussion of the Agreed Framework as a tool for instilling nonproliferation norms in North Korea, promoting North-South dialogue on the Korean peninsula, and modernizing the North''s legal and economic systems, see Joel Wit, pp. 61-64.
24 25 See George Perkovich, "The Korea Precedent: A Price Worth Paying For a Safer World," p. A23, Washington Post (September 28, 1994).
26 Kim Dae Jung, "New Challenges for the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia," speech to the Asia Society, New York, NY, at http://www.asiasociety.org/speeches/kim.html (June 8, 1998); Hong Soon-young, "Thawing Korea''s Cold War," Foreign Affairs (May/June 1999).
27 Ralph A. Cossa, Monitoring the Agreed Framework: A Third Anniversary "Report Card", Pacific Forum CSIS, Honolulu (October 1997); Managing Change on the Korean Peninsula, pp. 18-20, Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York, NY (1998); Wade Huntley and Timothy L. Savage, "Agreed Framework at the Crossroads," #99-05, Nautilus Institute, Berkeley, CA (1999).
28 David E. Sanger, "U.S. Aide Due in North Korea With Deal to Lift Sanctions," New York Times (May 21, 1999).
29 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft, and Richard Murphy, "Differentiated Containment," Foreign Affairs (May/June 1997); Hon. Lee H. Hamilton, "Reassessing U.S. Policy Toward Iran," speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, at http://www.foreignrelations.org/studies/transcripts/hamilton.html (April 15, 1998); Gary Sick, "Rethinking Dual Containment," Survival (Spring 1998); Geoffrey Kemp, American and Iran: Road Maps and Realism, The Nixon Center, Washington, DC (1998); Hon. Cyrus R. Vance, "U.S.-Iranian Relations: Has the Time Come?", speech to the Asia Society, New York, NY, at http://www.asiasociety.org/speeches/vance.html (January 13, 1999).
30 For skeptical assessments of the degree of change in Iranian policies since Khatami''s election, see Patrick Clawson, Michael Eisenstadt, Eliyahu Kanovsky, and David Menashri, Iran Under Khatami: A Political, Economic, and Military Assessment, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC (1998), and "Next Steps with Iran: A Debate," Middle East Quarterly (June 1998).
31 Proliferation: Threat and Response, pp. [xx], U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC (1997); Andrew Koch and Jeanette Wolf, "Iran''s Nuclear Procurement Program: How Close to the Bomb?," The Nonproliferation Review (Fall 1997).
32 Foran and Spector, p. 31. 33 Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 61-62, 70.
34 Mark Hibbs, "Russia, Others Pressed Iran Prior to NPT Extension Vote," p. 9, Nucleonics Week (May 22, 1995).
35 "Bushehr Completion By 2002, With Russian Assistance," p. 49, Nuclear News (January 1999). For many years, Russia handled spent fuel from [most? all?] of the reactors it exported in this manner. However, it is not clear how Minatom will square this commitment in the case of Iran with a recent provision in Russian environmental law which forbids storage of foreign radioactive waste on Russian territory.
36 37 Michael R. Gordon, "Russia to Offer U.S. Deal to End Iran Nuclear Aid," New York Times (March 17, 1999); Sergey Rybak and Margaret L. Ryan, "Adamov Says Iran Asked Russia to Discuss Three More Reactors," p. 16, Nucleonics Week (March 25, 1999). The proposal was to be discussed during then-Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov''s visit to Washington in March 1999, which was canceled over NATO military action in Kosovo; it remains unclear whether the offer is still pending [CHECK].
38
39 Under the Additional Protocol, Iran would have to declare and provide access to all aspects of its fuel cycle, as well as related research and development activities. This step would make it easier to verify whether Iran is conducting weapon-related activities under the cover of a peaceful use program. 40 John C. Baker, Non-Proliferation Incentives for Russia and Ukraine, pp. 75-76, Adelphi Paper 309, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London (May 1997); testimony of Henry Sokolski before the House Committee on International Relations, in Russian Foreign Policy and Proliferation to Rogue Regimes, hearing (March 25, 1999).
41 David Reese, The Prospects for North Korea''s Survival, pp. 77-79, Adelphi Paper 323, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London (November 1998); personal communication with official involved in implementation of Agreed Framework, May 1999.
42 Kemp, pp. 97-98.43 Madeleine K. Albright, speech to the Asia Society, New York, NY, at http://www.asiasociety.org/speeches/albright.html (June 17, 1998); Martin S. Indyk, "U.S. Policy in the Middle East," speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY, at http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks (April 22, 1999).
Copyright ©1999 the American Nuclear Society
Reprinted with Permission.
Weeks, Jennifer. “Iran and North Korea: Two Tests for U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Policy.” American Nuclear Society, 30 August - 2 September 1999.
