Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security
Learning to Deter: Deterrence Failure and Success in the Israel-Hezbollah Conflict, 2006–16
Comparing Israel and Hezbollah’s interactions before and after the 2006 Lebanon War offers insights into the sources of deterrence stability. Since 2006, Israel and Hezbollah have learned to apply rational deterrence theory. Careful communication of capabilities and resolve has contributed to a decade without war. This history also illustrates how a weak actor can deter a stronger adversary by minimizing its own vulnerability and maximizing that of its opponent.
Daniel Sobelman, "Learning to Deter: Deterrence Failure and Success in the Israel-Hezbollah Conflict, 2006–16," International Security, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Winter 2016/17), pp. 151–196.
Analysis & Opinions - The National Interest
Analysis & Opinions - Foreign Policy
In the Spotlight
Discussion Paper - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School
Policy Brief - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School Quarterly Journal: International Security
Policy Brief - Harvard Project on Climate Agreements