A Nuclear Crisis In Russia

A Nuclear Crisis In Russia

by Kenneth N. Luongo and Matthew Bunn

As world attention focuses on Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction, another proliferation crisis is brewing.

Six years of steady improvement in the security of Russia's nuclear stockpile threatens to unravel under the crushing blow of that country's current economic crisis. Not since the collapse of the old Soviet Union has the situation been so dire.

The realities are alarming. Weapon guards leave their posts to forage for food. Nonpayment of bills results in the shut-off of electricity for high-tech security systems needed to protect weapons-grade uranium and plutonium. Young, undertrained security guards go on shooting sprees at nuclear plants and submarines.

Under these conditions security cannot be assured.

The United States has a significant stake in this problem because of the danger that nuclear weapons and materials could easily be stolen or misappropriated, causing a worldwide proliferation nightmare. Indeed, Iraq spent billions trying to produce a nuclear arsenal. It should not be provided a shortcut to this aim by seizing the opportunity to purchase diverted materials or components.

So far, a combination of US-financed security programs and remarkable patriotism and devotion to duty under deteriorating circumstances by Russia's nuclear workers and military professionals have prevented catastrophe. But the situation is worsening and it requires a swift, targeted response to preempt possible disaster.

In the short term, the United States should take two actions.

First, it should insist that Russia spend a substantial fraction of the income that it will soon get from US uranium purchases to pay nuclear guards and workers and finance other steps to improve security. Congress set aside $325 million to help maintain an agreement under which the United States purchases diluted Russian uranium, and these funds will be available as soon as the Russians complete a commercial agreement for the sale of a portion of the uranium.

To supplement this step, the United States should, on an emergency basis, provide from surplus stocks food, warm clothing for guards, and backup power supplies for security systems.

Second, the United States should underwrite a low-interest line of credit that Russia can draw on specifically to support and improve its nuclear security forces and measures. The use of the money should be verified up front so profiteers do not divert the funds. This would allow impoverished facilities to pay their electric bills and guards through the coming winter while discussions on future permanent remedies take place between governments.

To begin that larger dialogue, the assumptions and planning for projects already underway must be reexamined. There are a substantial number of these projects and most are still worthwhile, but priorities need to be set, and many projects may require additional US or outside funding and schedule adjustments.

More important, these discussions must focus on moving US-Russian nuclear security cooperation to a new level by tackling some very tough issues. These include: professionalizing the guard force; consolidating weapons materials into a much smaller number of facilities; arranging for the purchase of the many small, vulnerable stockpiles of highly enriched uranium that exist; and grappling in a serious but socially acceptable way with the inevitable downsizing and conversion of major parts of the vast Russian nuclear complex.

The Clinton administration and key members of Congress have traditionally been responsive to the need to work with Russia on the issue of nuclear security. Many of these collaborations were unimagined during the Cold War. Russia's economic meltdown has thrown into question past plans that assumed that the country was on a democratic and capitalist trajectory, but the underlying objective of preventing nuclear proliferation is still an American security priority. Rapid action in support of this goal is as urgently needed in Russia as it is in Iraq.