South Asian Nuclear Proliferation

South Asian Nuclear Proliferation

by Farah Zahra

The White House is currently engaged in coming up with 'incentives' for both Pakistan as well as India to prevent total collapse of its nuclear non-proliferation policy in the region. From Pakistan the question is: What do we get for not carrying out our own nuclear test? From India the question is: What will you give us if we join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? This question can be rephrased as: What will you give us for not carrying out our 7th nuclear test (including the one 24 yrs ago)?

Barely two weeks after the Indian nuclear explosions a 'pragmatic' approach is being sought from the US Government towards India by think tanks and business lobbies who find the sanctions on India faulty and futile.Robert Manning, Director Asian Studies Council of Foreign Relations, suggests it would be wrong to cancel Clinton's visit planned to India, which can be utilized to explore additional ways to bottle up nuclear proliferation in South Asia. Stephen Cohen, leading South Asian analyst from Illinois University, feels if he was an Indian he would be scared by what appears to be a failure of Pakistan's (nuclear) command and control regime. Companies like Boeing which have had to halt negotiations with India's Jet Airways on 737 planes, do not want their deal hijacked by European Airbus Company.

India has taken recourse to swift and effective diplomacy endeavouring to brush the post-Pokhran dust under the carpet, asking the international community to rethink sanctions. Indian Ambassador to the US, Naresh Chandra's "amicable" discussions with Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering and senior US officials "on issues of mutual interest" succeeded in extracting assurances from US that sanctions on India would be "fair". Indian Commerce Minister Ramakrishna has warned the World Trade Organization how US 'unilateral' sanctions against India will jeopardize the world trade system. Hiked up Indian diplomatic activity in Washington aims at influencing the shape of sanctions to come. US Congress has begun to hint that it would consider removal of sanctions if India joins CTBT.

Projecting "willingness to talk" on joining CTBT as a major concession by India to the international community, the Indian Government has simultaneously admitted that the advancement of its nuclear programme needs no more tests (computer simulations will now suffice). However, it does envision nuclear energy cooperation with the US as part of any deal with the US.

The deal with Pakistan seems to be getting more unwieldy for the US to formulate.

Pakistan's incentive price for refraining from the test apparently exceeds US offer of delivery of F-16s (which Pakistan paid for 10 years ago) accompanied by some debt relief. Pakistan Government has not put forth the "wish list" that would simplify Washington's work on any package that it might formulate.

Majority of Pakistani analysts are either lamenting the aftermath of Indian nuclear tests and escalating tensions in South Asia or are soliciting a reciprocal test from Pakistan. A conspicuous poverty of conceptualization prevails among crusaders for restraint in Pakistan. Lopsided suggestions either precariously hinged on seeking economic benefits or proposing beefing up of nuclear/military capabilities emerge from Islamabad.

Former Chairman of Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission zealously advocates a full-fledged nuclear race with India (without soliciting a test). A Former Finance Minister is excited over potential increase in the textile export quota for Pakistan. Another prominent economist hints at total debt forgiveness for Pakistan "like Egypt got its total debts of $7bn written off". As if wanting to return to the pre-Indian test era, a professor of international relations preaches "minimum deterrence" ignoring declared Indian ambitions for maximum deterrence.

In the US, former Air Force General James Abrahamson has boldly suggested "a strategic shield" combined with technological and logistical support for Pakistan to set up sophisticated surveillance systems so that ".....ground monitoring facilities could co-ordinate with geo-synchronous satellites scanning microwave traffic over South Asia". Though more tangible than the vague "possibilities" expressed by the US Government, it is limited to only a 'warning' mechanism that would be indeed be incomplete without the strategic shield (that Abrahamson envisions and) the US is unlikely to offer.

For the Congress even the existing US military commitments in other parts of the world are over stretched. Half-baked proposals from the US officials and senators are not indications that the US is prepared to make a lasting, large-scale commitment to support Pakistan against India. Military aid to Pakistan remains the only convenient recourse for Congress where majority of legislators lack a sound understanding of South Asian regional realities. On the other hand, renewed US aid 1980s-style is not on the cards either.

Clinton's upcoming visit to China, the Chinese satellite issue and Indonesia are serious distractions for the US Government while Republican Congress members block immediate ratification of the CTBT by US and chastise Clinton administration for US satellites being in a blind spot orbit as India prepared for nuclear tests.

In such a scenario Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub is unlikely to land the task of verifying whether security guarantees from the US are 'physical' or 'on paper'. Even if such a scenario was to be envisioned it would not leave Gohar Ayub merely discerning the credibility of American guarantees, but, also executing US non proliferation demands— possibly without the choice of selecting treaties from the whole spectrum of the non proliferation regime.

Insurmountable constraints exist for the US to table a suggestion that answers Pakistani security concerns vis a vis India. Ironically enough, the White House might have to only deal with the Indian question.

Former South Asia bureau chief of The Washington Post, Selig Harrison, has suggested to the US that until an accommodation is reached with India, no agreement with Pakistan is possible. Islamabad may translate this as: once India signs the CTBT, it would be easy to coerce Pakistan into following suit.

Unless Islamabad has come to a silent resolve to conduct its nuclear test "at a time of its own choosing" (as its former Army Chief Aslam Beg suggests) it should speed up the process of formulating a plausible picture of its requirements from the US.

Even though President Clinton claims to be "working hard on this", Pakistan's expectations may be a far cry from what his hard work is likely to yield.