Abstract
Jim Walsh's column suggests ways to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, including recognition that proliferation is an international problem and that there is a need for new initiatives.
Fifty-five years ago this week, America dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. So began the nuclear age.
It hasn't gone as the experts predicted. There have been no "limited" nuclear wars, and although nine nations did eventually acquire nuclear weapons, an additional 20 countries started down the nuclear path only to stop and reverse course. Today, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, has more members than the United Nations.
The news has not been all good. Witness India and Pakistan; anxieties over North Korea and Israel; efforts by Iraq and others to harness the atom. And now a new nuclear threat: hundreds of metric tons of nuclear material in the former Soviet Union, much of it susceptible to theft.
What can we do to prevent the next Hiroshima? I have recently completed a book-length study that examines nonproliferation success stories - countries that considered acquiring nuclear weapons but instead renounced the bomb. I found three important principles:
Proliferation is an international problem. For decades, American officials have acted as if proliferation is a problem that could be settled in Washington and Moscow. New scholarship, including a wave of declassified documents from foreign archives, challenges whether this was ever true. And certainly today, decisions in Taipei or Tehran are as important as decisions in the two great capitals.
Nuclear decision-making reflects internal concerns. Today, a country's decision to pursue or forgo nuclear weapons depends less on international power politics and more on contests between domestic elements - army versus air force, treasury versus atomic energy commission, prime minister versus cabinet rivals.
Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons depends on building institutions. These institutions can be international - like the NPT or the International Atomic Energy Agency - or domestic. Scientific organizations that foster professional ethics; political parties opposed to proliferation; nongovernmental organizations that promote transparency - such organizations can make it more difficult for bomb advocates in near-nuclear countries to prevail.
New initiatives are needed, particularly in countries wrestling with the nuclear question. Today, most money spent on nonproliferation is spent in the United States. Yes, America is a critical player: We must support the efforts of like-minded leaders in India and Pakistan, in North and South Korea, in Israel, Taiwan and half a dozen other countries that possess nuclear weapons or that might seek refuge in the atom.
Today, we have a new opportunity: to help local leaders in foreign countries build the kinds of institutions that will guarantee a future free of nuclear conflict. Fifty-five years ago this week, America introduced the world to atomic warfare. In the next 55 years, America can help build a world where such weapons are never used again.
Walsh, James. “Three Keys to Preventing Spread of Nuclear Weapons.” Philadelphia Inquirer, August 9, 2000