ABSTRACT
For eight decades, the practice of nuclear deterrence has been treated as common sense in many influential policy-making and scholarly circles. This remains the case although most states neither possess nor rely on nuclear weapons. Yet, claims that deterrence averts conflict rest on reading nonevents as success. That framing downplays close calls and accidents, which suggest that humanity has often avoided nuclear catastrophe more by luck than design. Meanwhile, new potential proliferators, emerging and disruptive technologies, and multipolar rivalry are continuously raising the stakes of maintaining the nuclear status quo. Accordingly, this special issue aims to interrogate nuclear deterrence’s intellectual roots and political effects. Contributors belong to the global Beyond Nuclear Deterrence Working Group within the Research Network on Rethinking Nuclear Deterrence. The group’s discussions have examined public education, norms, and institutions; sought to elevate Global South and feminist perspectives; and laid out alternative security practices and verification pathways. The objective is not to prescribe a single blueprint but to launch a rigorous research agenda: to map risks entailed in nuclear-deterrence policy, test claims about its necessity, and identify credible routes to a durable post-nuclear-weapons order.
