Nuclear Issues

Pakistan's Ambassador to the U.S. Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry and Dean of the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University Adil Najam discuss the ups and downs of US-Pakistan relations and possibilities for engagement under the new US administration.

Dr. Ian Bremmer, expert in political risk and founder of the Eurasia Group, gave a seminar sponsored by the the Future of Diplomacy Project on Thursday, November 9 at the Harvard Kennedy School, titled “Managing Risk in an Unstable World."

As part of the India and South Asia Program’s annual speaker series, Ambassador MaleehaLodhi, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to the United Nations discussed her country’s regional agenda.

"The Obama Administration is on the way to becoming the peacemaking presidency, after having been handed down two wars (Iraq and Afghanistan) and having been urged to start two others (Syria and Iran). The way the President handled these challenges should ease the way for Hillary Clinton in 2016, should she decide to run."

"Following the parliamentary elections of Iraq in March 2010 and the long-time deadlock which had stalled formation of the coalition government for nearly 8 months and the West's disappointing efforts to talk with the Taliban, it is now crystal-clear that the United States cannot tackle these crises single-handedly and needs Iran's cooperation as the main regional actor in settling the crises in Iraq and Afghanistan, either during the presence and even after the withdrawal of American troops from both countries. The importance of this issue becomes manifest as one realizes that curbing terrorist activities in this region is directly connected to the establishment of security and stability in the region after the withdrawal of foreign troops. In such circumstances, Iran's role for the establishment and preservation of stability becomes crucial."

"George W. Bush's presidency really was that bad — and the fact that Obama has largely followed the same course is less a measure of Bush's wisdom than a reminder of the depth of the hole he dug his country into, as well as the institutionalized groupthink that dominates the U.S. foreign-policy establishment."

...[I]n Afghanistan, the American vision is that of a "bottom up" approach in a negotiation with the overwhelmingly Pashtun Taliban, not a "top down" one. In other words, coaxing away low-level Taliban fighters and their commanders ("reintegration"), rather than changing the government setup at Kabul by letting Taliban leaders become members of the government ("reconciliation"). Though reintegration may have some initial success, spurred on by money and jobs, it is unlikely to be permanent, given the Afghans' long history of changing sides. But also because those fighting against the US-backed government appeal to much more than money. They have successfully mobilized nationalist and islamist sentiment among the Pashtuns, which is hard for a perceived-corrupt government to combat through financial incentives.

"The Nobel Peace Prize Committee cited Obama's dedication to arms control and nonproliferation when announcing last Friday his selection as this year's laureate. If he creates a positive, mutually reinforcing dynamic in the way he presents and sequences the two treaties [NPT and CTBT], it will give momentum and coherence to follow-on negotiations and the agreements that they produce."

The United States must not provide Pakistani institutions with incentives to act counter to U.S. foreign policy objectives in the future. It has done so in the past. But until the spring of 2009, no comprehensive overview of the full funding to Pakistan was possible as the figures were kept secret. Those figures, as well as a full analysis of what is known about how they were spent, can now be evaluated. The available information paints a picture of a systemic lack of supervision in the provision of aid to Pakistan, often lax U.S. oversight, and the incentivization of U.S. taxpayer–funded corruption in the Pakistani military and security services. The author believes that this is the first attempt to present an overview of U.S. aid to Pakistan since 2001, evaluate it, and present recommendations on how to ensure that mistakes are not repeated and lessons are learned.