The Agreed Framework: A Path Towards Stability on the Korean Peninsula

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The Agreed Framework: A Path Towards Stability on the Korean Peninsula

In mid-1998, U.S. special envoy Charles Kartman initiated talks with his North Korean counterparts to resolve the growing crisis over the reclusive communist state''s suspect underground nuclear site. To determine whether it constitutes a resumption of Pyongyang''s nuclear weapons program, and hence a violation of the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework1, Kartman called for a U.S. inspection of the site. In light of North Korea''s past practice of brinkmanship and "pinging" the United States in order to catch Washington''s attention, the current crisis appears to be another case of Pyongyang''s established pattern of behavior. In this instance, Kim Jong Il''s regime is evidently reacting to Congress''s delay in meeting the heavy fuel oil shipments requirement of the Agreed Framework. To date, of the 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil that the United States is obligated to deliver to North Korea, only 390,000 tons have been shipped.

During the recent Congressional deliberations over the suspect site, Republican members renewed criticism of the 1994 nuclear accord and called for the cessation of American involvement in the agreement. Such a demand is irresponsible and short-sighted.

In the first instance, canceling the Agreed Framework would lead to a revisiting of the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis that nearly ignited a second Korean War. The accord averted such a conflict by fashioning together an international organization that is responsible for replacing North Korea''s past nuclear program with two new modem nuclear reactors. In doing so, this international body - the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) - is effectively removing North Korea''s ability to build a nuclear weapons arsenal as the new reactors will produce lower quantities of plutonium. Moreover, the new reactors will be under close international monitoring and verification.

Since the 1994 agreement, strong progress has been achieved towards realizing the ultimate goal of a nuclear weapons-free North Korea. Indeed, in late 1996, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) - the UN body responsible for safeguarding against the conversion of peaceful nuclear energy programs into weapons development projects - confirmed that North Korea had shut down its graphite— moderated reactor and ceased construction of two larger ones. More importantly, it verified that the 8,000 spent fuel rods previously removed from North Korea''s sole operating reactor had been canned and were ready for shipment abroad. The significance of this event was that the primary source of plutonium for nuclear weaponry had been secured, marking, in essence, the beginning of a nuclear free zone on the Korean peninsula.

In addition to being reckless, Congress''s call for the Agreed Framework''s demise is severely myopic as an American abrogation of the accord could reverse the advances recently realized in inter-Korean relations. While there have been bumps in the road since the signing of the agreement - with North Korean submarine incursions into South Korean waters and North Korea''s missile test over Japan - inter-Korean relations overall have benefited greatly as the agreement has bolstered the role of South Korea in guiding the direction of the Korean peninsula in the long-term. Although Pyongyang has taken the official position that it need only deal with Washington, in practice, extensive exchanges of personnel between South and North Korea will be required to build the new reactors. Importantly, the infusion of South Korean funds, as well as personnel, presents the unique opportunity to build societal bridges between the two Koreas.

The primary instrument that will help both Koreas to achieve this end is KEDO. Through this organization, the Agreed Framework facilitates the creation of unprecedented channels of communication and cooperation between North and South Korea. That is, these channels and ties are implicitly established, given that the implementation of the accord requires North-South collaboration. Although there are clauses written into the Agreed Framework which stipulate that Pyongyang must restart the North-South dialogue, there is nothing forcing North Korea to do so.

However, given that Pyongyang can only achieve its aim of securing the new modem reactors by cooperating with Seoul, there is essentially no need to elaborate upon how the two Koreas are to act toward each other. This assumption is based on the fact that Seoul will not only be financing 70 percent of the cost of building the new reactors, but will also be leading the implementation of the Supply Agreement which has designated the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), a South Korean firm, as the main contractor responsible for designing, fabricating, building, and managing the reactor project.

Pyongyang is clearly aware that without Seoul''s participation in the Agreed Framework, it will not be able to obtain the new reactors which it requires for its electric power needs. Consequently, it has no alternative but to work with the Kim Dae Jung government. Thus, in respect to ameliorating inter-Korean relations, the strength of the accord is that it is predicated on actions and not words.

The other significance of the agreement is that the United States and South Korea, by agreeing on the kind of deal they did, have more or less set forth the direction of their policies toward North Korea. The accord demonstrates that from now on they intend to engage the Kim Jong I1 regime. Such a policy is intended to steer the North into a more constructive and moderate direction. Clearly, Washington and Seoul are not forcing Pyongyang to relinquish its nuclear weapons program, but rather enticing it to do so. In this respect, they are applying the Chinese proverb which states that "the way to make a man remove his coat is with a warm sun, not a chill wind." (Indeed, this is the basis of South Korean President Kim Dae Jung''s "sunshine policy.")

In a practical sense, the sunshine approach is laying the foundation for a reunified Korea - a question of when, not if. Cognizant of both the enormous costs borne by the former West Germany when it essentially absorbed its eastern counterpart, and the reality that South Korea would not be able to repeat such an economic and social feat -especially in the midst of a debilitating financial crisis - the Kim Dae Jung government is using the Agreed Framework as an instrument of stability. The Blue House (the Korean version of the White House in Kwanghwamun) hopes that with stability will come the prospect for the utilization of private sector investment, mainly South Korean in origin, to build-up North Korea''s economic infrastructure to a sufficient level required for a smooth re-unification. This would, in effect, facilitate the much sought after "soft-landing." The recent tourism deal between Chung Ju Yong, the Hyundai chaebol founder, and North Korean leader Kim Jong I1, constitutes a landmark agreement that will further open the door between the long-divided Koreas.

Let there be no doubt that what has facilitated this constructive environment is the Agreed Framework. To cancel the accord over a hole in the ground - albeit a very large hole - would sacrifice the only bridge that enables Pyongyang, Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington to cooperate and to work together towards a common end. While it is prudent to investigate this suspect nuclear site, it is foolhardy to draw the sweeping conclusion that it is a resumption of North Korea''s nuclear weapons program. At the moment, the true purpose of the site is very much unclear. (A recent Council on Foreign Relations report titled "Managing Conflict on the Korean Peninsula" stated that a nuclear facility would take between three and five years to complete. Early "signature" of a nuclear-purpose structure would manifest itself in the third year of construction at the earliest. In light of the almost incapacitated state of the country, construction would take much longer than the above estimates.) If, after the planned U.S. inspection or "visit," as it is being termed in Washington, the evidence confirms that the site was indeed set-up for prohibited nuclear activity, efforts to address this violation of the Agreed Framework would be merited. Until that time, the accord should remain the primary engagement instrument in South Korea''s and the U.S.''s approach to North Korea.

John S. Park is a Ph.D. Candidate at the Center of International Studies, Cambridge University. During the 1998-99 academic year, he will be a Research Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University.

1 The official titles of North Korea and South Korea are the Democratic People''s Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, respectively. For the purposes of this article, the more common terms of North Korea and South Korea will be used.

Reproduced with Permission