Approaches to Design Basis Threat in Russia in the Context of Significant Increase of Terrorist Activity

Presented at the INMM 44th Annual Meeting, Phoenix, Arizona

Design Basis Threat is one of the main factors to be taken into account during design of physical protection system of nuclear facility. In according with IAEA’s recommendations outlined in INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected) “The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities” Design Basis Threat (DBT) defined as: “the attributes and characteristics of potential insider and/or external adversaries, who might attempt unauthorized removal of nuclear material or sabotage, against which a physical protection system is designed and evaluated”. Development of DBT is considered as one of the significant task during the work on domestic Russian regulations in the field of physical protection.

Events of the last years have demonstrated that terrorist attack (with the goal of stealing nuclear materials or sabotage with catastrophic consequences) should be considered among the top threats to nuclear facilities. Moreover, possible scale of terrorist acts significantly raises requirements to physical protection systems. In particular Russian situation, recent hostage taking event in Moscow in October 2002 and subsequent statements of Chechen terrorist leader regarding possible attacks against nuclear facilities confirmed that threat of attack by the group consisting of the large number of well-trained well-equipped terrorists should be considered as real and taken in to account during physical protection system development.

Within the context described above this paper is intended to analyze Russian approach to the development of design basis threat taking into account risk of attack against specific nuclear facilities. Russian approach to international cooperation in this sphere with particular emphasis on debated amendments to Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials will also be considered.