Debating America’s Next Steps in Iran: Wargaming the Decision Point Between Escalation and Withdrawal

The Harvard Kennedy School Armed Forces Committee (AFC), in partnership with the Defense, Emerging Technology, and Strategy (DETS) Program, convened a closed-door, structured debate to surface candid discussion on a contentious national security question. The session brought together two teams of Harvard students to wargame America’s next steps in Iran.

The debate centered on the question: Should the United States declare victory in Iran and wind the operation down, or pursue further offensive operations? The session took place on April 16, 2026, at a moment of uncertainty. A ceasefire had recently been announced on April 8, 2026, but questions remained regarding the status of Iran’s nuclear program, control of the Strait of Hormuz, and the durability of the regime’s military capabilities. At the same time, a U.S.-led blockade remained in place, restricting Iranian trade. With conditions still changing and no obvious endgame in sight, policymakers must decide whether to consolidate gains or expand operations.

Participants were pre-assigned opposing positions and given general courses of action that they could choose to follow, so long as they remained consistent with the overall direction of their side. One position argued that the president should declare victory and wind the operation down by declaring objectives achieved, shifting to deterrence, and pursuing diplomacy. The other side argued that the president should expand offensive operations by increasing military actions, improving leverage before negotiations, and securing freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. To force a clear policy discussion, no middle ground was permitted between these positions. The debate focused on interests, strategy, risk, and objectives, and yielded three themes highlighting the implications of U.S. action.

Both sides agreed that negotiation is necessary to end the conflict, but diverged on when the United States should come to the table and under what conditions.

The team advocating for escalation argued that the United States does not currently hold sufficient leverage and must sequence through continued military and economic pressure to improve its position before negotiating diplomatically. In their view, recent actions have not produced real concessions, and entering talks now would give Iran space to stall. Aggressive action is necessary to raise costs and force Iran to negotiate on more favorable terms for the U.S. This approach held that pressure creates leverage, and without it, negotiations are unlikely to yield favorable results.

The ‘withdrawal’ team argued that the present moment offers the strongest opportunity to negotiate, as the United States has already shown military competence and risks eroding its position over time. They argued that continued strikes further damage already limited trust and reduce the likelihood of meaningful diplomatic engagement. Declaring victory was seen as a way to strengthen U.S. credibility with allies while influencing the information environment by signaling success to domestic and international audiences. The blockades, while imposing heavy costs on Iran, are also raising global energy prices, straining allies and partners, and increasing pressure from American voters and partners. In this view, delaying negotiations risks losing leverage rather than building it, while causing sustained global harm.

The success of either approach ultimately depends on which side holds the upper hand and whether the status quo is survivable. The outcome of any negotiations will rely on how both countries assess the long-term implications of Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz, the effectiveness and durability of the American blockade, the status and trajectory of Iran’s nuclear capabilities, and the opportunity costs of U.S. attention and resources relative to competing priorities involving China and Russia. Central to this calculation is American credibility, whether the United States is seen as capable of both sustaining pressure and following through on negotiated commitments.

The two teams agreed that coalition alignment is strategically important for the United States to achieve the objectives it ultimately pursues. That alignment, however, is harder to maintain than to declare, because partners are bearing uneven costs. As a result, Washington’s partners and allies have competing interests and it needs to exercise leadership to keep those differences from undermining stability.

Gulf States

Gulf partners directly experience the conflict’s military and economic effects. Participants noted that disruption in the Strait of Hormuz and attacks on their territory could pull Gulf states away from the United States and toward alternative arrangements that better serve their immediate interests. At the same time, a rapid U.S. withdrawal would send a negative signal to regional partners who have relied on American presence and security commitments. The U.S. must work to preserve credibility as a security partner with these countries, while minimizing incentives for them to hedge against American protection.

Partners Beyond the Middle East

Participants also mentioned that allies and partners across the world, especially those who are not energy independent, would feel the effects of a prolonged crisis through higher energy and consumer prices. This outcome will have both economic and diplomatic effects, as domestic pressure in allied countries can weaken political support for a sustained U.S. approach. Over time, this could push partners to diversify their energy sources and reduce dependence on existing security frameworks. Any U.S. strategy should therefore account for the cumulative strain the crisis would place on these countries.

Israel

Israel was mentioned as a partner whose actions will be central to the conflict’s trajectory. Participants generally agreed that the United States should play an active leadership role in shaping Israeli behavior, since Israeli escalation could widen the conflict and strain coalition cohesion. Close coordination with Israel is important for maintaining stability, which means Washington must balance support for a close partner with efforts to keep the wider coalition aligned.

Finally, the United States must also consider the humanitarian effects of its actions, since allied support will depend in part on whether America’s conduct matches its stated values.

The teams were not just debating about how to proceed; they were debating what success even is. The central divide was over what the United States is ultimately trying to achieve, as every proposed next step depends on a clearly defined end state. Potential key objectives raised in the debate included eliminating or verifying rollback of Iran’s nuclear capability, securing or ensuring freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, maintaining a long-term deterrent posture in the region, minimizing harm to civilians, degrading Iran’s ability to threaten U.S. forces and allies, and, in some cases, pursuing regime change.

Not all of these objectives are achievable simultaneously, as both courses of action would reach different results, using vastly different tools. A negotiated wind-down may lead to deterrence, civilian protection, and a controlled nuclear outcome, while expanded offensive operations may better support coercive pressure, material gains, and political change. Moreover, the most ambitious objectives, like securing nuclear material or regime change, could imply a much larger commitment, including a physical ‘boots on the ground’ presence. 

Right now, the ambiguity in the United States’ plan creates flexibility, but it may undermine decisive action in the long run. The U.S. must choose what objectives are paramount to decide which approach will yield the best results. Without identifying which objectives take priority, policymakers risk mission creep and an endgame that expands each time one goal remains unmet.

The debate surfaced second-order effects of each strategy and clarified several tradeoffs policymakers would need to address before choosing a course of action. Participants made clear that negotiation is central to any plausible endgame, but that the conditions under which the United States enters talks will determine the leverage it brings and the kind of outcome it can secure. The discussion also underscored that any strategy would depend on alignment across stakeholders, especially allies and partners whose interests and exposure to the conflict are not the same. Finally, the United States must keep at the forefront the human costs of war, from civilian harm and regional instability to the economic burdens borne by partner nations and American voters.

Special thanks to our moderator, National Security Fellow Jay Ireland, and our participants:

• Alexa Kalach
• Anna Bartoux
• David Weidman
• Kathy Lee
• Nicholas Obletz
• Nik Karaffa

Disclaimer: This publication summarizes a structured academic debate and wargaming exercise conducted for educational purposes. Team assignments, arguments advanced, and courses of action explored were assigned for the purposes of the exercise and do not necessarily reflect the personal views of any participant. All named participants consented to being identified in connection with the event; names are included for attribution only and do not indicate support for any position or reveal any participant’s assigned team. This publication is not an official statement of policy and should not be understood as representing the views of Harvard University, Harvard Kennedy School, the Armed Forces Committee, the Defense, Emerging Technology, and Strategy Program, or any government agency, military service, employer, or institution with which any participant may be affiliated.