Science & Technology

Joseph Nye writes that even at this early stage, there are at least eight lessons— some old, some new— that the world is learning (or relearning) from the war in Ukraine.

Will China succeed in what some call its grand strategy of displacing American power? Whichever scenario emerges also depends on the strategy the US chooses in response, rites Joseph Nye.

Joseph Nye argues that prudence results from the fear of creating unintended consequences in unpredictable systems and can develop into a norm of nonuse or limited use of certain weapons or a norm of limiting targets. Something like this happened with nuclear weapons when the superpowers came close to the brink of nuclear war in 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis. The Limited Test Ban Treaty followed a year later.

Stephen Walt looks back at the Trump administration as four years of big ambitions, a handful of successes—and many more failures. He concludes that it was more than a missed opportunity because Trump's blunders have left the United States in much worse shape than when he took office. 

Stephen Walt elaborates on what to expect from the next four years, regardless of who wins the vote.

John P. Holdren and coauthors argue that the next presidential administration must renew its commitment to investing in science and technology regardless of who wins in November. The United States is facing a great host of challenges that underscore the urgent need for renewed investment in the science and technology enterprise and the rapid application of new scientific knowledge and advanced technology to solve complex problems.

Joseph Nye writes that the world is increasingly obsessed with the ongoing power struggle between the United States and China. But the technology-driven shift of power away from states to transnational actors and global forces brings a new and unfamiliar complexity to global affairs.

Despite the far-reaching effects of the current pandemic,  the essential nature of world politics will not be transformed. The territorial state will remain the basic building-block of international affairs, nationalism will remain a powerful political force, and the major powers will continue to compete for influence in myriad ways. Global institutions, transnational networks, and assorted non-state actors will still play important roles, of course, but the present crisis will not produce a dramatic and enduring increase in global governance or significantly higher levels of international cooperation. In short, the post-COVID-19 world will be less open, less free, less prosperous, and more competitive than the world many people expected to emerge only a few years ago.

Henry Kissinger warns that many existing domestic and international institutions that have helped govern the past decades will not survive the Covid-19 crisis. He is surely correct.

Joseph Nye writes that the institutional costs of using a wrecking ball approach may reduce American power in the long run.