U.S. China Relations
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from U.S. China Relations

What Xi, Trump, and Putin Should Agree on in Shenzhen

Xi Jinping, Donald Trump, and Vladimir Putin will meet in Shenzhen on Thursday, November 19, on the sidelines of the APEC summit. It will be the first face-to-face meeting of the three leaders. 

Hui Zhang writes why this could be a critical moment for to start a trilateral arms control agreement, preventing nuclear proliferation. 

China's President Xi Jinping stands as US President Donald Trump, left, and Russian President Vladimir Putin shake hands before the welcome banquet at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shenzhen, Guangdong province, China, Wednesday Nov. 18, 2026. (Iori Sagisawa/Pool via AP)
China's President Xi Jinping stands as US President Donald Trump, left, and Russian President Vladimir Putin shake hands before the welcome banquet at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shenzhen, Guangdong province, China, Wednesday Nov. 18, 2026. (Iori Sagisawa/Pool via AP)

On Thursday, Xi Jinping, Donald Trump, and Vladimir Putin will meet in Shenzhen, on the sidelines of the APEC summit. It will be the first face-to-face meeting of the three leaders. Trump says he wants to talk about “denuclearization.” Beijing says the leaders will exchange views on “promoting strategic stability in major-power relations.”

The timing could hardly be more important. New START expired in February, and for the first time in half a century the largest nuclear arsenals face no limits at all. China’s arsenal has more than doubled since 2019, to about 620 warheads, and the Pentagon expects more than 1,000 by 2030. The United States is building Golden Dome, a multilayer missile defense with interceptors in space. Without restraint, the three countries are heading for a three-way arms race that none of them wants.

A one-day meeting cannot negotiate warhead numbers. But it can do something more basic: agree on the principles that would make real negotiations possible, and direct experts to begin negotiating. That is what the leaders should aim for.

Why Talks Have Gone Nowhere

Trilateral arms control faces a simple problem. The three countries are like a stool with three uneven legs. The United States and Russia each have thousands of warheads; China has about 620. Beijing will not accept a treaty that writes its inferiority into law. Washington will not accept a freeze that leaves China free to build up while US and Russian forces are limited.

Worse, each side begins by taking the other’s core demand off the table. Washington rules out mutual vulnerability with China and no first use, the two things Beijing wants most. Beijing rules out numerical limits and transparency, the two things Washington wants most. Not much is left to talk about.

The way out is to stop counting warheads alone. China’s force requirement is not set by parity with the United States. It is set by assured retaliation: how many warheads China needs to survive a first strike and still get through US defenses. Other concerns, including regional developments, also play a role. But that number depends above all on two choices made in Washington: the size of the US arsenal that could be used against China, and the effectiveness of US missile defense. Limit those, and China’s incentives for further expansion would shrink, creating room for reciprocal restraint.

Principles for a Joint Statement

In Shenzhen, the three leaders could adopt a short political statement built on six principles.

First, no winners. They should reaffirm, as the five nuclear-weapon states declared in January 2022, that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, and pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against one another.

Second, strategic stability. When Xi and Trump met in Beijing in May, they agreed to build a “constructive bilateral relationship of strategic stability.” Beijing has now extended that goal to all three powers. Between nuclear powers, strategic stability means that no side has an incentive to strike first, even in a crisis. That requires mutual vulnerability: each side must be confident that its retaliatory force would survive and get through. Washington and Moscow have lived with this reality for decades, even as each sought ways to threaten the other’s forces. The leaders need not endorse mutual vulnerability as a formal doctrine. It is enough to recognize it as a strategic fact, to commit to preserving each other’s ability to retaliate and to reducing incentives to strike first, and to accept its corollary: a stable relationship between strategic offense and defense.

Third, no arms race. They should pledge to avoid an arms race and to continue nuclear disarmament, with the states that have the largest arsenals continuing to take the lead.

Fourth, equality. No agreement should legalize any party’s strategic inferiority. Differences in numbers may remain, but as each country’s own choice, not as unequal legal obligations.

Fifth, human control. All three should commit that the decision to use nuclear weapons will always remain under human control, and that they will not attack one another’s nuclear command, control, and early-warning systems.

Sixth, dialogue. They should launch a regular trilateral dialogue on strategic stability and nuclear risk reduction, with bilateral channels alongside it, and direct their experts to begin work on the steps below.

What Each Country Would Bring

Principles alone are not enough. They would be backed by specific steps. These need not be taken all at once, and no side would be asked to move first on faith. The process could begin with reciprocal transparency and risk-reduction measures, followed by negotiated constraints on selected offensive and defensive capabilities. More ambitious numerical limits and longer-term restrictions would depend on demonstrated compliance and growing confidence in each side’s commitments.

The United States and Russia would continue to observe New START’s central limits, 1,550 deployed strategic warheads and 700 deployed launchers, and resume talks on further reductions. If Washington and Moscow build up, China cannot be expected to limit itself.

The United States would limit its strategic defenses. Reviving the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty by name is not realistic, but its logic still holds. In the near term, Washington could cap its midcourse interceptors at an agreed level, for example 100 to 200. In the longer term, it would forgo space-based interceptors and space-based lasers, for example under a renewable ten-year ban. Defenses against a few missiles from North Korea would remain allowed; defenses that could undermine Chinese and Russian deterrence would not. These limits would take effect only together with the matching Chinese steps described below; if either side fails to follow through, the other regains its freedom of action.

China would make clear where its buildup is heading. It would reaffirm no first use, state that it seeks a reliable second-strike force rather than parity, and pledge not to adopt a launch-on-warning posture. It could begin by providing greater transparency about the scale and trajectory of its buildup, including its total number of warheads. As long as the United States and Russia stay within New START’s limits and US defenses stay within agreed limits, this could lead to negotiations on a ceiling. A ceiling of about 1,000 warheads, roughly where the Pentagon expects China to be by 2030 anyway, would not legitimize new growth; it would stop a buildup that would otherwise continue. A numerical ceiling is one possible outcome, but not the only measure of success. Clarifying China’s intentions and future force requirements, and other incremental steps that reduce uncertainty, would also build trust.

China would also declare a halt to producing fissile material for weapons. By my estimate, China’s legacy stockpile, produced before 1987, amounts to about 13.9 tons of highly enriched uranium and 4.0 tons of weapon-grade plutonium, enough uranium for only about 700 modern warheads. But satellite imagery suggests that China has resumed producing weapon-grade uranium at Emeishan, and it may already have added substantially to that stock. A halt would not by itself stop China’s buildup, but it would cap the material available for future growth. It applies the same rule to everyone, has broad international support, and can be verified at a few sites without inspecting warheads or bases. Beijing has long declined to declare a formal moratorium in order to keep its options open should US defenses expand, so it is unlikely to agree unless the halt is linked to limits on US missile defense.

Russia would also bring its own restraint. Beyond observing New START’s limits, Moscow could contribute through renewed strategic transparency, including data exchanges, notifications, and resumed inspections; by bringing its new strategic delivery systems, such as the Poseidon nuclear torpedo and the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile, under the strategic limits; and through reciprocal measures to reduce nuclear escalation risks in Europe. More demanding commitments, including transparency about nonstrategic nuclear weapons, could come in later negotiations.

Finally, all three would refrain from weaponizing outer space. If the United States forgoes space-based interceptors, China and Russia would refrain from destructive anti-satellite tests. All three would reaffirm their moratoriums on nuclear testing, and Washington and Beijing could open the Nevada and Lop Nur test sites to reciprocal visits.

Why Each Would Gain

Each country would get something it needs. Washington would gain greater predictability about China’s nuclear trajectory, a halt to China’s fissile material production, and a framework for negotiating a ceiling and more ambitious limits over time. Beijing would get what it wants most: predictable restraints on the threat that US defenses and counterforce pose to its deterrent, without a treaty that locks in its inferiority. Moscow would get the link between offense and defense it has sought since the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002, in return for renewed transparency and limits on its new strategic systems.

Washington will say that Golden Dome is non-negotiable. But a defense that only drives others to build more warheads makes no one safer. The United States and the Soviet Union learned that lesson in 1972.

The leaders need not settle numbers in Shenzhen. They need only agree on the right principles: a nuclear war cannot be won, strategic stability rests on mutual vulnerability, and limits on offense must go together with limits on defense, pursued through a gradual process of reciprocal, verifiable restraint. If they do, the first trilateral summit could also be the start of the first trilateral arms control.

Recommended citation

Zhang, Hui. “What Xi, Trump, and Putin Should Agree on in Shenzhen.” November 18, 2026

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