Articles

38 Items

Chinese President Xi Jinping poses for photographers after delivering his speech, during a visit at the UNESCO headquarters, in Paris, Thursday March 27, 2014.

AP Photo/Christian Hartmann/Pool

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

China's Grand Strategy under Xi Jinping: Reassurance, Reform, and Resistance

    Author:
  • Avery Goldstein
| Summer 2020

While China’s grand strategy under Xi Jinping is clearly distinctive, it does not fundamentally break with the grand strategy that Chinese leaders have embraced since the early 1990s—one that aims to realize China’s “dream of national rejuvenation.”

U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (from left) greet South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem at Washington National Airport

DoD/Department of the Air Force

Journal Article - Small Wars Journal

Bernard Fall as an Andrew Marshall Avant la Lettre (Part II)

| Dec. 09, 2019

SWJ interview with Nathaniel L. Moir, Ph.D., an Ernest May Postdoctoral Fellow in History and Policy at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. Dr. Moir is completing a book manuscript on Bernard Fall for publication.

Xi Jingping and other world leaders attend an APEC-ASEAN dialogue.

(Jorge Silva/Pool Photo via AP)

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

China in a World of Orders: Rethinking Compliance and Challenge in Beijing’s International Relations

    Author:
  • Alastair Iain Johnston
| Fall 2019

Rather than debating whether China is challenging a single, U.S.-dominated liberal order, scholars and analysts should consider China’s actions in relation to multiple orders in different domains, where China is supportive of some, unsupportive of others, and partially supportive of still others.

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Correspondence: Military-Technological Imitation and Rising Powers

| Fall 2019

Michael C. Horowitz and Shahryar Pasandideh respond to Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli’s winter 2018/19 article, “Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet: Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage.”

1st Foreign Company parachutist of heavy mortars in Indochina with 2 mortars Brandt 120 mm type A.M. 50

Public Domain/Davric

Magazine Article - War Room

Jungle Mission: A Review

| Oct. 18, 2019

Nathaniel Moir reviews  Jungle Mission by René Riesen. He writes that Jungle Mission exemplifies applied history.  For armed forces engaging with diverse cultures, this book provides an individual precedent and useful analogies that illuminate contemporary problems where cultural intelligence is critical.

Chinese stealth fighter in the air

(China Military Online)

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet: Military-Technological Superiority, Systems Integration, and the Challenges of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber-Espionage

| Winter 2018/19

The extraordinary complexity of today’s advanced weapons systems has significantly reduced the ability of states to imitate other states’ military technology. Consequently, U.S. rivals such as China will continue to struggle to develop indigenous capabilities that can match those of the United States.

Journal Article - Small Wars Journal

Twilight Zone Conflicts: Employing Gray Tactics in Cyber Operations

| October 27, 2016

"...[A]ctors that employ gray tactics in cyber operations need not be successful in actually infiltrating a system to further their revisionist ambitions. Rather, the sheer ramifications from the cyber action itself, has the power to disturb a nation's psyche and challenge the geopolitical status quo."

Chinese President Xi Jinping is displayed on a big screen in Beijing as Chinese battle tanks roll by during a Sept. 3, 2015 parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of Japan's surrender during World War II.

(AP Photo)

Magazine Article - The Atlantic

The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?

| September 24, 2015

The defining question about global order for this generation is whether China and the United States can escape Thucydides’s Trap. The Greek historian’s metaphor reminds us of the attendant dangers when a rising power rivals a ruling power—as Athens challenged Sparta in ancient Greece, or as Germany did Britain a century ago. Most such contests have ended badly, often for both nations, a team of mine at the Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs has concluded after analyzing the historical record. In 12 of 16 cases over the past 500 years, the result was war. When the parties avoided war, it required huge, painful adjustments in attitudes and actions on the part not just of the challenger but also the challenged.

US and Ukrainian soldiers stand guard during opening ceremony of the 'Fiarles Guardian - 2015', Ukrainian-US Peacekeeping and Security command and staff training, in western Ukraine, in Lviv region, Monday, April 20, 2015.

(AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky)

Magazine Article - The National Interest

Russia and America: Stumbling to War

| May-June 2015

In the United States and Europe, many believe that the best way to prevent Russia’s resumption of its historic imperial mission is to assure the independence of Ukraine. They insist that the West must do whatever is required to stop the Kremlin from establishing direct or indirect control over that country. Otherwise, they foresee Russia reassembling the former Soviet empire and threatening all of Europe. Conversely, in Russia, many claim that while Russia is willing to recognize Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (with the exception of Crimea), Moscow will demand no less than any other great power would on its border. Security on its western frontier requires a special relationship with Ukraine and a degree of deference expected in major powers’ spheres of influence. More specifically, Russia’s establishment sentiment holds that the country can never be secure if Ukraine joins NATO or becomes a part of a hostile Euro-Atlantic community. From their perspective, this makes Ukraine’s nonadversarial status a nonnegotiable demand for any Russia powerful enough to defend its national-security interests.