Articles

The arguments in favor of the United States' declaring that the only purpose of its nuclear weapons is to deter others who possess them from using theirs — in other words, that in no circumstances will this country use nuclear weapons first — are far stronger than the arguments against this stance. It must be hoped that the next US administration will take this no-first-use step promptly.

The Chinese Communist Party changed its internal security strategy in Xinjiang in early 2017 because of Beijing’s changing perception of Uyghur involvement in transnational Islamic militancy abroad, which heightened perceived domestic vulnerability to terrorism.

States are more likely to reveal secret military capabilities during peacetime competition when the effects of the asset in question can be substituted with another military advantage and when the adversary is not equipped with countermeasures.

International criminal tribunals are more likely to deter violence against civilians when they have prosecutorial support and when combatant groups are both centralized and supported by liberal constituencies.

In the Middle East, the demise of détente in the 1970s between the United States and Soviet Union can be attributed to U.S. actions, contrary to the conventional wisdom that the Soviet Union was responsible.

Presidents will alter the timing and nature of military strategy in light of electoral constraints, delaying or weakening controversial courses of action.

Nonviolent resistance scholar Erica Chenoweth explains the key ingredients of successful social movements.

President Trump has strongly criticized NATO and European countries on defense spending, publicly hectored European leaders, upset summits meetings, and pressured traditional allies with economic sanctions.  Transatlantic tensions have been called a “crisis”.  Yet the current situation echoes a certain historical continuity.  In its seventy years of existence, NATO has weathered more severe crises and proved itself capable of extraordinary resilience.  Then, as now, the alliance found renewed purpose in ambitious programs of adaptation.  In adapting to today’s challenges, Europeans and Americans have a shared interest in looking back to the future.   

Over the last two decades, there has been a dramatic increase in the popularity of financial sanctions as an instrument of US foreign policy to address security threats ranging from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and terrorism to human rights violations and transnational crime. Washington’s policymakers have prized these tools for their ability to rapidly apply pressure against foreign targets with few perceived repercussions against American business interests. The problem, however, is that Washington is ignoring a growing tension between financial sanctions designed to support economic statecraft (with non-financial goals) and those designed to protect the international financial system. Confusing the two sends mixed signals to adversaries as well as allies and undermines US credibility and commitment to upholding international banking rules and norms. If Washington cannot reconcile these competing processes, it is unlikely that future administrations will enjoy the same foreign policy levers, leaving the United States at a significant disadvantage.

In this article, we develop a new framework for combating transnational criminal activity. We argue that global illicit flows, perpetrated by organized crime, in the interstices of lawful trade and travel, embody a critical and debilitating non-state security threat in today’s world, one that the Westphalian international system of sovereign states remains ill-equipped to confront. Accordingly, we seek to generate a wider discussion in the field regarding a revised approach to this threat that is situated within a global framework of collaborative law enforcement which incorporates, in appropriate fashion, certain military and counter-terrorist strategies.

The propositions we advance in support of a revised approach to countering transnational crime and its globalized web-enabled criminals include: (a) terrorism is one species of transnational crime; (b) the criminal justice model of arrest, prosecution, conviction and incarceration is a partial and insufficient response to transnational crime; (c) national security and law enforcement functions should be viewed analytically as a “public security” continuum rather than disciplines separated by bright lines; (d) countering transnational criminal organizations effectively may require development of a hybrid law enforcement/military capacity and new strategic and tactical doctrines, including safeguards against abuse, to govern its deployment; (e) joint border management within nations and between them, coordinated with the private sector, is required and inter-agency cooperation and multilateral institutions must be strengthened in accordance with new international norms and (f) North America, a region construed as extending from Colombia to the Arctic and from Bermuda to Hawaii, could develop in the future, together with the European Union, as an initial site for a model pilot of the new approach.